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RECONCILING MARITIME LIENS 
THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
AND 
ACT 
DAVID GRAY CARLSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Few matters are assigned exclusively to the jurisdiction of the 
admiralty courts. Claimants with common law remedies have the 
option to leave admiralty court and pursue their remedies in state 
court or, if the proper jurisdictional requirements can be met, in 
federal court.' But two areas that are undeniably the exclusive prov­
ince of the admiralty judge are in rem foreclosure upon maritime 
liens® and petitions by vessel owners under the Limitation of Liability 
Act.' 
The two procedures have certain features in common. Each 
system generates a fund which may be established, in part, by judicial 
sale of the vessel.'' Each system provides an option whereby the vessel 
owner may avoid loss of the vessel by substituting adequate security.® 
Under each system, claimants are expected to litigate for the fund, 
with adverse consequences if they choose not to do so.® 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; 
B.A., 1974, University of California at Santa Barbara; J.D., 1977, Hastings College of Law, 
University of California. _ 
' 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976); see aho infra note 146. The current "saving for suitors' language 
in § 1331(1) does not mention "common law remedies" as did the original clause. See 1 Stat. 77 
(1789); D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 18 (1970). The new clause has been thought 
to intend no change in the law, however. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW or ADMIRALTY § 1-
13, at 39 (2d ed. 1975). 
Admiralty actions are not "federal questions," so that diversity jurisdiction is required it a 
maritime plaintiff wishes to sue outside admiralty but in federal court. Romero v. International 
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359-80 (1959). Of course, if a federal statute is the source 
of the right, federal question jurisdiction exists. Id. at 359 (Jones Act). 
« The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 427-31 (1866); see also The Rock Island Bridge, 
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213, 215 (1867) ("The lien and the proceeding in rem are, therefore, correla­
tive—where one exists, the other can be taken, and not otherwise. ); Interocean Shipping Co. v. 
M/V Lygaria, 512 F. Supp. 960, 963 (D. Md. 1981) ("It has long been settled that a libel in rem 
is maintainable only in connection with a maritime lien. ). 
' 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1976) ("Limitation Act"); see Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 104, 123-24 (1871). Petitions of limitation of liability are governed by the Supplemental 
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. F, which refers to 
petitions as "complaints." 
< Compare FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. E(9) (providing for the disposition of property by sale) 
with id F(L) (providing for the transfer to court-appointed trustee of interest in the vessel). 
« Compare FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. E(5)(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2464 (1976) (release of vessel for 
double security) with id. F(L) (deposit of sum at least equal to amount of value of interest in 
vessel and frei^t or approved security therefor). 
" Under in rem practice, lienholders must intervene before the fund is distributed. By this 
time, the vessel will have been sold in an in rem sale, which destroys all outstanding liens. The 
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In spite of these common features, the in rem and limitation 
procedures have diametrically opposed purposes. The in rem proce­
dure is the creditor's delight. Creditors are automatically granted liens 
on the "guilty" vessel for various tort and contract claims.^ If they 
have a maritime lien, they may cause the arrest and sale of the 
encumbered vessel. The proceeds of the sale are then divided among 
the lien claimants according to a complex judge-made system of prior­
ities.® The Limitation of Liability Act, on the other hand, is the bane 
of creditors and a major commercial advantage for vessel owners. In a 
limitation proceeding, the vessel owner can petition the admiralty 
court to limit his liability for claims arising from a voyage to the value 
of the vessel in question, plus earned freight.® The vessel owner is 
required to create a fund, either by surrendering the vessel and earned 
freight to a court-appointed trustee, by paying in an equivalent sum, 
or by posting security for this amount.'" Once having established an 
adequate fund, the vessel owner is entitled to an injunction which 
bars all those whose claims arose during the voyage for which limita­
tion of liability is sought from litigating in other courts," whether the 
Trenton, 4 F. 657, 659-60 (E.D. Mich. 1880). And once the fund has been distributed, lienhold-
ers have no further rights on their liens. American Bank of Wage Claims v. Registry of the Dist. 
Court of Guam, 431 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1970). Of course, their in personam rights 
against the vessel owner, if any, survive. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 9-90, at 801-
02. 
In petitions for limitation of liability, the claimants are required to cease litigation and 
continue further proceedings only in the limitation proceeding. FED. R. GIV. P. SUPP. F(3), (4). 
Those claimants who fail to make a claim lose all right to pursue the vessel owner, who is 
completely exonerated from further liability. 46 U.S.G. § 185 (1976). 
' G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, §§ 9-1 to 9-2, at 587-89. The lien is not against all 
vessels owned by the maritime debtor, but against the vessel involved in the claim. Where the 
debtor owns Vessel A and Vessel B and takes supplies aboard Vessel A, the supplier has no 
maritime lien against Vessel B. Cf. United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 
(1844) (vessel that commits an act of aggression is treated as the offender notwithstanding and 
apart from the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner); United States v. The Little 
Charles, 26 Fed. Cas. 979, 982 (C.C.D. Va. 1818) (same); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. City of 
Athens, 83 F. Supp. 67, 74-75 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nam. Acker v. City of Athens, 177 F.2d 961 
(4th Cir. 1949) (per curiam) (same). 
" See infra text accompanying notes 53-54. 
' 46 U.S.C. §§ 183(a), 184 (1976). Under § 184, a creditor may also petition to limit the 
liability of the vessel owner, but, as can well be imagined, there is no recorded case of a creditor 
so petitioning. It is theoretically possible, however, that a low-priority lienholder might recover 
more in a limitation proceeding than out of it. For example, where the vessel is the only asset, the 
creditor, in a limitation proceeding, would receive some small amount on a pro rata basis but 
would receive nothing under a distribution of an in rem fund. 
46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976); FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. F(1). Obviously, whenever a bond can be 
posted, a vessel owner may also pay in the full limitation amount. In general, when reference is 
made to posting a bond, whatever is said will apply as well to payment of the full sum into the 
court registry. 
" 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976); FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. F(3). 
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claims be in rem against the vesseF^ or in personam against the vessel 
owner. The resulting "concourse"—or concursus as it is picturesquely 
called 1'—requires each claimant to litigate only in the limitation 
proceeding. After claims are adjudicated, the claimants share pro­
portionately in the limitation fund,i® even though the claimants may 
have liens which, under maritime law, are accorded strict priorities 
over one another.'® 
There is tremendous risk of confusion and disarray when the two 
distribution systems collide. The vessel owners may limit liability for 
claims that arise during a single voyage, and therefore only a portion 
of the maritime liens outstanding may be forced to litigate in the 
concursus. These "limitation" liens have no priorities inter se. Other 
lienholders not subject to limitation (the "nonlimitation" liens) are 
free to pursue the vessel, if they can. When the vessel owner chooses to 
surrender his vessel in a limitation proceeding, the nonlimitation lien-
holders are compelled to follow the vessel into the limitation proceed­
ing if they are to foreclose on their liens. Once there, the priorities 
between the limitation liens and the nonlimitation liens are directly at 
issue. Priority between these liens remains a complete mystery. 
These problems have not yet been worked out in litigation, so 
that navigation of these two maritime relics through the narrow 
channels in which they travel is treacherous in the extreme. It is my 
purpose in this Article to suggest some "rules of navigation" in the 
hope that collision can be avoided, or at least that, when it occurs, 
there will be a minimum of wreckage. 
1. THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT 
The Limitation Act was passed in 1851'^ as part of a general 
movement in the nineteenth century to protect the vessel owner from 
In re Moore, 278 F. Supp. 260, 265-66 (E.D. Mich. 1968) (letter of undertaking, promis­
ing that ship insurer would not appear in any lawsuit arising from claim in consideration for 
claimant's refraining from attaching ship, does not allow claimant to press claim independent 
from owner's limitation of liability proceedings); cf. The "Benefactor" S.S. Co. v. Mount, 103 
U.S. 239, 245-46, 249 (1880) (in rem proceedings against steamship stayed until determination of 
the proceedings on the petition for limited liability). 
" See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 415, 417 (1954); Black 
Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Bobert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 392-94, 401-02 (1949); In re 
Helena Marine Serv., Inc. v. Sioux City, 564 F.2d 15, 18, 19 (8th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 435 
U.S. 1006 (1978). 
" FED. B. CIV. P. SUPP. F(4). 
" See infra text accompanying notes 55-58. 
" See infra text accompanying notes 53-54. 
" 9 Stat. 635 (1851). 
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liability where he was not personally at fault.Under the Limitation 
Act, a vessel owner'® with no personal fault^" can limit his liability to 
the value of his ownership interest in the vessel plus freight earned 
during the limitation voyage. Beyond that amount, the Act exoner­
ates the vessel owner from further liability. Thus, the Limitation Act 
protects the vessel owner from liability solely by respondeat supe­
rior. 
The so-called Loss of Life amendments to the Act,^® passed in 
1936 after a major sea disaster,^^ have provided a minor exception to 
this pattern. Where the vessel is a seagoing ship,^® the vessel owner 
" See G. GILMORE & G. BLACK, supra note 1, §§ 10-1 to 10-2, at 818-19; Donovan, The 
Origins and Development of Limitation of Shipowners' Liability, 53 TUL. L. REV. 999 1011-13 
(1979). 
" The Limitation Act protects not only vessel owners, but also charterers who "man, victual 
and navigate such vessel . . . ." 46 U.S.G. § 186 (1976). For the purpose of this Article, 1 shall 
refer only to vessel owners, although everything said about them usually applies to "bareboat 
charterers" as well. 
™ 46 U.S.G. § 183(a) (1976) (vessel owner must have no "privity or knowledge"). Privity or 
knowledge is equated with the owner's negligence, as distinguished from the crew's negligence. 
See G. GILMORE & G. BLACK, supra note 1, §§ 10-20 to 10-23, at 877-82 ("[P]rivity or knowledge 
must be that of the owner himself."). When the vessel owner is a corporation, the managing 
agents take the place of the vessel owner in assessing whether privity and knowledge are absent. 
See Spencer Kellogg & Sons v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502, 511 (1932). The vessel owner may not limit 
liability on "personal contracts." Signal Oil & Gas Go. v. The Barge W-701, 654 F.2d 1164, 1168 
(5th Gir. 1981). Courts have decided that charter parties contracts are personal, but that bills of 
lading (and hence all cargo claims) are not. Id. at 1168-69. The law on personal contracts seems 
to have little to do with whether the vessel owner personally makes the contract. Rather, the 
standard is whether the contract is of a type that the courts have declared is ordinarily made 
personally by a vessel owner. See Gastles, The Personal Contract Doctrine: An Anomaly in 
American Maritime Law, 62 YALE L.J. 1030 (1953); Growe, Kinds of Losses Subject to Limita­
tion; The "Personal Contract" Doctrine, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1979). 
" 46 U.S.G. § 183 (1976). Of course, the vessel owner will be insured, so that he will recover 
much of the value of the vessel from his insurer. The vessel owner is therefore likely to lose very 
little from a maritime disaster. See Maryland Casualty Go. v. Gushing, 347 U.S. 409 418-22 
(1954). 
" South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1976 A.M.G. 456 
(S.D. Ga. 1975). 
" 46 U.S.G. § 183(b) (1976). 
" See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Gushing, 347 U.S. 409, 414 n.4 (1954). The disaster was the 
sinking of the Morro Castle, a passenger vessel arriving in New York from the Caribbean. As a 
result of the accident, 135 lives were lost. The vessel owner established $20,000 as the limitation 
fund, against claims of $13,500,000, but it received $2,100,000 in reimbursement from the hull 
insurers. The case was settled, however, for $890,000. Duncan, Limitation of Shipowners' 
Liability: Parties Entitled to Limit; the Vessel; the Fund, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1046, 1076 (1979); see 
also Donovan, supra note 18, at 1031-33 (discussing the origins of the Loss of Life amendments). 
" 46 U.S.G. § 183(b) (1976). Elsewhere, the statute says that, as used in § 183(b): 
[T]he term "seagoing vessel" shall not include pleasure yachts, tugs, towboats, 
towing vessels, tank vessels, fishing vessels or their tenders, self-propelled lighters, 
nondescript self-propelled vessels, canal boats, scows, car floats, barges, lighters or 
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may not limit liability against personal injury and wrongful death 
claimants if the master of the vessel has "privity or knowledge" at the 
commencement of the voyage.^® Even where the master's fault pre­
vents limitation against personal injury claims, limitation of liability is 
still available against cargo claimants, provided the vessel owner is not 
otherwise at fault. 
The Limitation Act permits a limitation of the vessel owner's 
personal liability for claims arising from a specific voyage^® or its 
equivalent.The amount for which he is liable is the value of the 
vessel, as determined after the voyage,®® and freight earned during the 
voyage.®® The Limitation Act requires that a fund be set up to satisfy 
all "limitation claims." When the vessel owner has set up the fund he 
is exonerated from any other liability.®^ 
When the narrowly drawn Loss of Life amendments apply to the 
voyage—i.e., voyage by a seagoing vessel—additional liability is im­
posed. In such cases, the vessel owner must supplement the limitation 
fund with a "personal injury" fund whenever the amount of the 
limitation fund going to the personal injury and wrongful death 
nondescript non-self-propelled vessels, even though the same may be seagoing vessels 
w i t h i n  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  s u c h  t e r m  a s  u s e d  i n  s e c t i o n  1 8 8  o f  t h i s  t i t l e  . . . .  
46 U.S.C. § 183(f) (1976). The language certainly sounds as if pleasure yachts, tugs, etc., are 
immune from having to contribute to the personal injury fund, but courts have managed to 
conclude that all seagoing vessels, etc., must contribute. See G. GILMORE & G. BLACK, supra note 
1, § 10-35, at 922 n.l39a; Donovan, supra note 18, at 1078-82. 
'i' 46 U.S.C. § 183(e) (1976). 
" Id.; see Moore-MeCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 586-87 (2d Cir. 
1961), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962). 
" The "single voyage" rule has been established by case law. See The City of Norwich, 118 
U.S. 468, 491 (1886). For the Loss of Life amendments, a slightly different rule applies. Under 
46 U.S.C. § 183(d) (1976), a new fund must be set up for every "distinct occasion" on a voyage in 
which injury occurs. See Donovan, supra note 18, at 1082-84. Under straight limitation, only 
one fund for the entire voyage need be set up. See generally The City of Norwieh, 118 U.S. 468, 
492-93 (1886) (liability established by value of interest of owner in vessel and freight when 
voyage ends). 
" The Limitation Act does not require that a "voyage" occur. In re Moore, 278 F. Supp. 260, 
262 (E.D. Mich. 1968); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-47, at 948-49. Where no 
voyage has occurred, the outward boundaries of the limitation period are based upon the 
"incident" which gives rise to claims. See Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Jones, 50 F.2d 828, 830 (3d Cir. 
1931); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-47, at 948-49; Crowe, supra note 20, at 1131. 
™ In re Zebroid Trawling Corp., 428 F.2d 226, 228 (1st Cir. 1970); The City of Norwich, 
118 U.S. 468, 492 (1886). A strange eorollary to the obligation to contribute the value of the 
vessel is the further obligation to contribute the recovery made against the other vessel in a 
collision case. See Harmon, Discharge and Waiver of Maritime Liens, 47 TUL. L. REV. 786, 799-
800 (1973). 
" The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894). 
M 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). 
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claimants is less than $60 times the vessel's registered tonnage.This 
fund is set aside exclusively for the personal injury and wrongful death 
claimants.''' 
Under section 185 of the Act, the vessel owner may establish the 
basic limitation fund, at his option, by one of three methods. He may 
tender the vessel, together with earned freight and any other sums of 
money which may be required, or he may keep the vessel and post an 
" Id. § 183(b). The calculation of the personal injury fund is quite complex. First, the court 
must determine the pro rata share of the basic limitation fund which, absent the personal injury 
fund, would go to the personal injury and wrongful death claimants. Id. ("If . . . the portion of 
[the limitation fund] applicable to the payment of losses in respect of loss of life or bodily injury is 
less than $60 per ton of such vessel's tonnage . . . ."); see Oliver J. Olson & Co. v. American S.S. 
Marine Leopard, 356 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1966) (no personal injury fund unless the § 183(c) fund 
is insufficient); Purdy, The Recent Amendment to the Maritime Limitation oj Liability Statutes, 
5 BBOOKLYN L. REV. 42, 51-53 (1935). Naturally, this calculation requires that the claims first be 
litigated to the admiralty court. See In re Luckenbach S.S. Co., 1953 A.M.C. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 
1953): G. CILMOBE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-34, at 92. But see In re Panoceanic Tankers 
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 313, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (bond required since portion going to personal 
injury plaintiffs was clearly inadequate). 
Once the proportion of the fund going to these claimants is determined, the court then 
subtracts the amount from the product of the vessel's registered tonnage and $60. The result, if a 
positive number, is the amount which the vessel owner must pay in order to complete the 
personal injury fund. 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1976) ("[S]uch portion shall be increased to an amount 
equal to $60 per ton . . . ."). Formulaically, the calculation is expressed as follows: 
Under this formula, where there is any money in the limitation fund, the vessel owner will be 
compelled to contribute something less than $60 per registered ton into the personal injury fund. 
Property claimants therefore do not gain a larger share of the basic limitation fund when the 
personal injury fund is established, since the same proportion of the limitation fund which would 
otherwise go to the personal injury claimants constitutes part of the personal injury fund. Olson, 
356 F.2d at 737 n.5. 
" 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1976). The personal injury fund is not the only situation where 
different limitation claimants have different rights to different funds. Another curio of limitation 
law is the so-called flotilla doctrine, introduced by Justice Holmes in Liverpool, Brazil & River 
Plate Steam Navigation Co. v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 251 U.S. 48 (1919). In that case, the 
Supreme Court held, in a collision incident, that the limitation fund for a tug towing barges 
owned by the same party should be the value of the tug, not the flotilla. See In re Oswego Barge 
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 323-24 (N.D.N.Y., 1977) (flotilla doctrine still good law), aff'd in part, 
rec'd in part, 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981). The flotilla doctrine was not generally favored hy 
later courts, see G. CILMOBE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-32, at 918 ("a great judge's 
momentary aberration"), and was limited solely to collision cases. Thus, where a contractual 
claim can be made out, the limitation fund must represent the entire flotilla. E.g., Standard 
Dredging Co. v. Kristiansen, 67 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1933) (seaman's personal injury suit 
based on contractual relation with employer); Agrico Chem. Co. v. S.S. Atlantic Forest, 459 F. 
Supp. 638, 651-55 (E.D. La. 1978) (suit by cargo owner for damage to property), ajf'd, 620 F.2d 
487 (5th Cir. 1980). Where collision claims and other claims are present in the same limitation 
proceeding for a flotilla, the court will have to set up different funds and allocate them to the 
different claimants separately. See Donovan, supra note 18, at 1072-73. 
Contribution to 
Personal Injury Fund 
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equivalent bond or pay an equivalent sum of money into the court 
registry. In case he chooses to surrender the vessel, the court must 
appoint a trustee to sell the vessel and to apply the proceeds toward 
the limitation fund.®® 
A vessel owner's option of surrendering the vessel can be compli­
cated by factual circumstances in which the vessel owner does not 
control the vessel. Most typically, a vessel owner may be only a 
minority owner without the power to surrender the vessel over the 
opposition of the other owners, who may prefer to retain the vessel 
and post a bond. It may also commonly be the case that the vessel is 
chartered to another by the time the limitation proceeding com­
mences. Under these circumstances, the vessel owner may have no 
ability to proceed by surrender of the vessel. Nevertheless, he is enti­
tled to limit his liability if he pays the amount or posts security on the 
amount which represents his interest in the vessel.®® 
One important situation in which the vessel owner's power to 
surrender the vessel is lost is when the vessel has been arrested in rem 
on the libel of a claimant against whom a vessel owner may not limit 
liability. Such a lienholder is not precluded from proceeding against 
the vessel in an in rem proceeding if the arrest can be made before the 
vessel is surrendered to the limitation trustee. As will become appar­
ent later, claimants with liens arising before the commencement of 
the limitation voyage (the "antecedent liens") may proceed against the 
vessel without interference from the Limitation Act. 
In F/V" Zebroid,''' a preferred ship mortgagee (an antecedent 
lienholder) brought an in rem proceeding against the Zebroid to 
foreclose on the mortgage. The vessel was sold for $45,000, and the 
funds were entered into the court's registry. At this point, the widow 
of the Zebroid's captain (who had been lost at sea) intervened, claim­
ing a tort lien superior to that accorded to the ship mortgagee. Her 
claim for damages so far exceeded the value of the vessel that the 
owner filed a petition for limitation of liability in a separate action. 
To establish the limitation fund, the vessel owner asked that it be 
allowed to "surrender the vessel" by contributing the fund created in 
the in rem proceeding commenced by the mortgagee. 
" 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Of course, where the vessel is destroyed and no freight exists, the 
vessel owner has no liability, in which case there is no need to surrender anything, nor any reason 
to post a bond. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 420 (plurality opinion), 
433 (Black, J., dissenting) (1954); Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 127 (1871); In 
re Boat Camden, Inc., 569 F.2d 1072 (1st Cir. 1978). 
See The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 505-06 (1886). 
" 1970 A.M.C. 113 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'dsub nam. In re Zebroid Trawling Corp., 428 F.2d 
226 (1st Cir. 1970). 
268 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:261 
The district court initially granted the vessel owner's request on 
an ex parte motion, at which point the fund in the in rem proceeding 
was ordered transferred to the limitation proceeding. Without a res 
upon which to foreclose, the mortgagee was forced to intervene in the 
new limitation proceeding, wherein it requested a reversal of this 
transfer. The district court repented and revoked its transfer of the in 
rem fund over to the limitation proceeding. 
The court of appeals agreed that the fund created by the in rem 
proceeding could not be wrested from the mortgagee. The mortgage 
lien, reasoned the court, arose prior to the limitation voyage. The 
mortgagee therefore was not subject to the Limitation Act and could 
not be forced into the limitation proceeding, where it would have to 
compete with other claimants for the limitation fund.'® 
That the fund, created by the judicial sale of a vessel in an in rem 
proceeding, cannot be taken away from an antecedent lienholder and 
given to the limitation claimants is undoubtedly correct. The ratio 
decidendi here was that the antecedent lienholder whose claim ac­
crued prior to the limitation voyage could not be made subject to the 
Limitation Act. If the lienholder was subject to the Act, the claimant 
would have been compelled by the court's injunction to drop the in 
rem action and pursue his rights only in the limitation proceeding.'® 
In such a case, the vessel owner, in lieu of surrendering the vessel, may 
contribute the fund created by the in rem sale.^® Thus, Zebroid 
stands merely for the proposition that if the vessel has been arrested 
pursuant to a lien not subject to the Act (e.g., an antecedent lien), the 
fund created by an in rem sale in that action may not be used to 
" "[0]bligations which accrued prior to the voyage, not heing subject to limitation, remain 
unaffected by the proceeding. Since vis-a-vis the owner they do not stand to he reduced, it must 
follow that he cannot throw the security interests of those lienors into the pot." 428 F.2d at 229. 
" Id. at 228 ("The right to limit claims . . . applies only to the claims arising during the one 
voyage .... This includes all liens attaching during the voyage . . . ."); see also Just v. 
Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 386 (1941). 
" Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 124-25 (1871); The Mendota, 14 F. 358 
(S.D.N.Y. 1882) (transfer from state quasi in rem attachment); FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. F(9) ("If 
the vessel shall have been sold, the proceeds shall represent the vessel for the purposes of these 
rules."). The district court in Zebroid, 1970 A.M.C. at 115, held that this language applied only 
to venue, since it appears in the venue subsection of Rule F. If it applied only to venue, 
presumably the words would not have referred to "these rules" but to "this subsection" or "for 
the purposes of venue." 
One author assumes that, whereas the in rem fund can be used for surrender purposes by the 
vessel owner, the fund may not be transferred. Rather, the limitation proceeding must be 
transferred where the fund is. Staring, Limitation Practice and Procedure, 53 TUL. L. REV. 
1134,1142-43 (1979). Such a view seems unnecessarily restrictive of the court's choice of the most 
convenient forum. If all the libellants in the in rem proceeding must halt their litigation, there is 
no compelling reason why the in rem fund cannot be transferred. See Continental Grain Co. v. 
The FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960) (in rem action transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976)). 
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establish the limitation fund (thereby denying the antecedent lien-
holder his rights). The vessel owner under these circumstances has lost 
his option to surrender the vessel. But other than arrest by an exempt 
lienholder, reduction of the vessel into a fund does not, without more, 
prevent the vessel owner from surrendering the vessel for purposes of 
the Limitation Act. 
11. IN REM DISTRIBUTIONS V. DISTRIBUTIONS 
UNDER THE LIMITATION ACT 
Maritime liens are supplied by the general maritime law as for­
mulated by the courts, with the exception of a few narrow types of 
liens owing their existence to federal statute.In general, most 
maritime tort and contract claims are secured by maritime liens on 
the "guilty" vessel.'*^ Whether any given type of claim gives rise to a 
lien has been decided on a case-by-case basis. 
One key difference between in rem procedure and limitation 
procedure, both of which involve distribution of a fund, is that, after 
the proceedings are over, the maritime lienholder is still free to pursue 
the vessel owner in personam, if necessary.The limitation claim­
ant, of course, is not.^® Exoneration of a vessel owner's personal 
liability is the whole point of a limitation proceeding. In addition, 
maritime liens run against any accretions to the vessel added after the 
claim underlying the lien has arisen.^® Limitation claimants have no 
analogous advantage. When the limitation voyage ends, the vessel is 
valued then and there for the purpose of limitation of the vessel 
" E.g., Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. § 194 (1976) (lien for criminal fine); Rivers & Harbors 
Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 412 (1976) (lien for damage to navigational aids); 35 
C.F.R. § 117.5 (1980) (lien on wrecks in the Panama Canal). Prior to the Federal Maritime Lien 
Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 971-975 (1976), the Supreme Court refused to recognize liens arising from 
supply and repair contracts performed in the vessel's home port or in a port in the same state as 
the home port. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1875). State law, however, could 
supply the lien, and the state legislation would be enforced in the federal admiralty courts. The 
General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819). The Federal Maritime Lien Act was passed to 
establish federal law on "home port" maritime liens. See Dampskibsselskabet Dannebrog v. 
Signal Oil & Gas Co., 310 U.S. 268, 271-72 (1940). 
" See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 9-20, at 624. 
" Id. at 625. 
" E.g., Bollinger & Boyd Serv., Inc. v. Captain Claude Bass, 576 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(ship mortgage deficiency). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 9-89, at 800-
01. 
« See 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) (vessel owner exonerated after the limitation fund is estab­
lished). 
" The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 503 (1886); The Joseph Warner, 32 F. Supp. 532 (D. 
Mass. 1939). 
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owner's liability. If the vessel owner adds to the value of the vessel 
thereafter, the amount of his liability is not increased.^'' 
Limitation claimants may take some minuscule amount of com­
fort from the fact that the limitation fund includes not only the value 
of the vessel hut the earned freight as well,''® not to mention the 
personal injury fund which arises in cases of certain oceangoing voy­
ages.'® Earned freight can he substantial. In the celebrated case of 
The Titanic,^ fourteen rowhoats were the sole surviving parts of the 
vessel. But earned freight amounted to $91,000. These additional 
sums are not ordinarily available to a maritime lienholder when he 
libels the vessel in rem. While it is said that maritime liens exist on 
freight, independent jurisdictional grounds must be established. 
Hence, attachment of freight is problematic at best.®' Also, owners of 
vessels that qualify under the Loss of Life amendments must provide 
substantial funds reserved solely for personal injury claimants.®® 
Maritime lienholders have no analogous right in an in rem proceed­
ing. 
Maritime liens are subject to a strict order of priority. The order 
of priority may be roughly summarized as follows: (A) custodial ex­
penses of the admiralty court; (B) seamen's wages; (C) salvage; (D) 
torts; (E) contracts; and (F) cargo claims.®® Within each category, 
the admiralty law imposes its unique rule of "last in time, first in 
right." The typical in rem action can be analogized to lienholders 
falling in line, first by category, and second according to the principle 
" The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. at 502-03; see infra note 158. 
" 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976). 
" Id. § 183(b). 
209 F. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), rev'd sub nam. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor, 233 
U.S. 718 (1914); Duncan, supra note 24, at 1046-47. 
" Maritime liens on freights are frequently said to exist. E.g., Schirmer Stevedoring Co. v. 
Seaboard Stevedoring Corp., 306 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1962). In fact, they seem to be little more 
than attachments of debts owed to the vessel owner. See United States v. Freights, Etc., of S.S. 
Mount Shasta, 274 U.S. 466, 470 (1927). To state that a maritime lien exists with regard to such 
debt is to say that when the debt is attached, it will be distributed according to maritime lien 
priorities. A more interesting proposition is whether the lien on freight survives after the freight is 
actually paid to the vessel owner. See Gulf Oil Trading Co. v. Creole Supply, 596 F.2d 515, 521 
(2d Cir. 1979) (issue sidestepped). In any case, freight must be within the court's jurisdiction 
before the lien can be foreclosed. Id. Arrest of the vessel does not establish arrest of the freights, 
so that reaching the freights is often impossible or unjustifiably expensive. 
" 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1976). In the Yarmouth Castle disaster, the vessel was worth $32,402, 
and claims worth $55,000,000 were filed. The vessel owner stood ready to pay the $60 per ton 
amount, but the limitation proceeding was dismissed on choice of law grounds. In re Chadade 
S.S. Co., 266 F. Supp. 517, 519 (S.D. Fla. 1967). If the personal injury fund had been 
established, the personal injury claimants would have had an extra $33,000 to divide between 
them. See Donovan, supra note 18, at 1051. 
" See G. CILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 9-58, at 734; Varian, Rank and Priority of 
Maritime Liens, 47 TUL. L. REV. 751, 753 (1973). 
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of "last in time, first in right." Each claimant gets 100% of his claim 
before the next claimant in line is entitled to a nickel.®^ 
Needless to say, the maritime system for dividing the proceeds of 
an in rem action against a vessel is the farthest concept imaginable 
from a proportional sharing of the fund. In contrast to the "one-at-a-
time" maritime lien system, the Limitation Act requires that limita­
tion claimants share pro rata in the limitation fund.®® This rule 
essentially repeals maritime lien status bet\veen limitation claimants. 
Thus, an unsecured claimant such as a Jones Act plaintiff®® or a 
nonmaritime plaintiff shares proportionately with a lienholder.®^ And 
" See The William Leishear, 21 F.2d 862, 863 (D. Md. 1927). 
" Equivocation might have been necessary on this point because of the egregious nature in 
which our ancestors drafted the Limitation Act. Section 184 of the Act, which governs appor­
tionment of the limitation fund, states: 
Whenever any . . . loss, or destruction is suffered by several freighters or 
owners of.. . . property ... on the same voyage, and the whole value of the vessel, 
and her freight for the voyage, is not sufficient to make compensation to each of 
them, they ehall receive compensation from the owner of the vessel in proportion to 
their respective losses .... . I TU I .J. • 
46 U.S.C. § 184 (1976). Read literally, only cargo owners are to share proportionately. The Act is 
silent on the fate of injury claimants, salvage claimants, or collision claimants, who are not 
usually owners of property aboard the vessel. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, at its first 
opportunity, interpreted § 184 to mean that all claimants who can be compelled to interplead for 
the fund must share proportionately with each other. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
104, 127-28 (1871). r j 
Gilmore and Black cite some ancient cases (none after 1907) in which the limitation fund 
was distributed according to lien priorities. G. GILMORE & G. BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-39, 928-
29 On the strength of these cases, they question whether an admiralty court should ignore lien 
priorites, since a bankruptcy court would not ignore them. Id. at 930. The difference between 
bankruptcy and limitation procedure is that the distribution of the limitation fund is governed by 
the "pro rata" language of 46 U.S.G. § 184 (1976). In comparison, secured creditors in bank­
ruptcy are not required to share pro rata to the extent of their interest in collateral. 11 U.S.G. § 
506(b) (Supp. 1981). 
» See Plamals v. S.S. "Pinar del Rio," 277 U.S. 151 (1928). Of course, most seamen who can 
assert the Jones Act may also join an action for unseaworthiness. The unseaworthiness claim 
carries lien status, and the Jones Act action may be joined with it. Richards, Maritime Liens in 
Tort, General Average, and Salvage, 47 TUL. L. REV. 569, 573-75 (1973). 
" See Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911) (limitation of liabUity is possible against 
nonmaritime claims). Gilmore and Black wonder whether an unsecured claimant such as a Jones 
Act plaintiff might b6 deemed behind all secured claimants when the limitation fund is distrib­
uted. G. GILMORE & G. BLACK, supra note 1, § 6-22, at 341. This concern obviously applies to 
nonmaritime claimants as well. 
There is no justification for the view that pro rata sharing means that the secured claims get 
the entire fund before the unsecured claims get anything. As was stated, supra note 55, 46 
U.S.G. § 184 (1976) states that only cargo claimants should share pro rata but that the Supreme 
Gourt has stated that all claims come within the pro rata provision. FED. R. GIV. P. SUPP. F(8) 
states that all claimants to the fund shall share pro rata. This language suggests no distinction 
between secured and unsecured creditors. Also, 46 U.S.G. § 183(a) (1976) states that the vessel 
owners' liability for any property loss, personal injury, collision, or "any act, matter, or thing, 
loss, damage or forfeiture" shall be limited to the value of the vessel plus earned freight. This 
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a party with a high priority lien (a salvor, for example) shares propor­
tionally with a low priority lienholder (for instance, a cargo claim).®® 
III. A SUGGESTION: THE LIMITATION ACT ESTOPS 
THE LIENS OF LIMITATION CLAIMANTS 
It is beyond question that a limitation claimant who has arrested 
the vessel prior to the petition for limitation can be compelled to halt 
his action and to proceed further only in the limitation proceeding.®® 
This is true even where the vessel owner has given a "letter of under­
taking" to stand for suit in order to avoid the arrest of the vessel.®" A 
limitation claimant's inability to enforce the lien outside of the limita­
tion proceeding, coupled with pro rata sharing within the proceeding, 
seems to eliminate all aspects and features of a maritime lien. 
Can we then proclaim that enforcement of the liens underlying 
the limitation claims is completely estopped, not only inter se but as 
against nonlimitation liens as well? Such a doctrine would solve the 
perplexing priority problems which might arise if nonlimitation liens 
compete with limitation liens for the proceeds of a vessel surrendered 
in a limitation proceeding. These priority problems will be laid out in 
due course,®' but preliminarily it must be conceded that estoppel of 
limitation liens has the effect of reversing maritime priorities. A non-
language sounds as if each claim should be compensated somehow, whereas a distinction 
between secured and unsecured claims suggests that some will not be compensated. See also 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 417 (1954) ("The elaborate notice provisions 
[pertaining to the limitation proceedings] are designed to . . . ensure that all claimants, not just a 
favored few, will come in on an equal footing to obtain a pro rata share of their damages."); 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 215 (1927) ("[T]he fund is 
to be distributed to all established claims . . . whether they be liens in admiralty or not . . . ."). 
Furthermore, the exoneration granted to the vessel owner is with regard to personal liability, not 
merely in rem liability. It is therefore likely that Congress intended to grant every claimant, 
whether secured or not, a piece of the fund in exchange for the exoneration of personal liability. 
" See Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 122 (1871) (cargo lien and collision 
lien are equivalents under the Limitation Act). For examples of lien priorities, see The William 
Leishear, 21 F.2d 862 (D. Md. 1927) (high priority of salvage); The St. Paul, 277 F. 99 
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (low priority of cargo claims). 
^ See The "Benefactor" S.S. Co. v. Mount, 103 U.S. 239 (1880). But see United States v. 
Ohio Valley Co., 510 F.2d 1184, 1188-89 (7th Cir. 1975) (Limitation Act does not apply to in 
rem claims). The Ohio Valley case may safely be dismissed as aberrant. In re Oswego Barge 
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 316-19 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 664 F.2d 327 (2d 
Cir. 1981). 
In re Moore, 278 F. Supp. 260, 265-66 (E.D. Mich. 1968). Gilmore and Black wonder 
whether the letter of undertaking in Moore could be a "personal contract" against which there 
can be no limitation of liability. See supra note 20. In the end they concur in the Moore court's 
"sensible decision not to become entangled in such speculative matters." G. GILMORE & C. 
BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-26, at 902-03. 
" See infra text accompanying notes 158-65. For now, the priority problem may be summa­
rized as follows; Lien A is superior to Lien B, which is superior to Lien C. Lien A and Lien C are 
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limitation lien may be from an inferior category (repair or supply, for 
example) whereas the limitation lien may be comparatively prestig­
ious (such as salvage). If enforcement of the salvage lien is estopped, 
the humble repair lien prevails. Also, a lien antecedent to the limita­
tion voyage may fall within the same category as the limitation lien, 
as when both are tort claims. The limitation lien should win under the 
rule of "last in time, first in right." If enforcement of the Umitation lien 
is estopped, however, the lien first in time prevails. In spite of the 
apparent violence done to maritime priorities, estoppel of limitation 
liens poses no risk of prejudice to the maritime rights of any interested 
party,®® and it has the benefit of eliminating the insoluble priority 
problems which otherwise arise when limitation liens compete against 
nonlimitation liens.®® 
Estoppel of limitation liens ®^ has never been declared to be the 
law by any court,®® and at least one highly questionable case stands to 
the contrary.®® The greater threat to a doctrine of estoppel lies in 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rule F(8).®'' This rule 
tracks section 184 of the Act in stating that distributions to limitation 
claimants must be pro rata and not according to maritime priorities. 
Rule F(8) also specifies that, in spite of this pro rata distribution, the 
admiralty court should save "to all parties any priority to which they 
may be legally entitled." This language is sufficiently ambiguous that 
it might be taken as precluding the suggested doctrine of estoppel, but 
closer analysis shows that the Supreme Court had no intent to pre­
clude such a development when it promulgated the Rule.®® 
limitation liens which are accorded equal status under the Limitation Act. Lien B is not subject 
to the Limitation Act. Lienholder A cannot assert priority over Lienholder B without also taking 
priority over Lienholder C, who is entitled to equal dignity with Lienholder A. Lien B may not 
take priority over Lien C without destroying Lien A's top priority, and so forth. The problem is 
similar to the circular priorities described in 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 1020 (1965). 
® See infra text accompanying notes 163-68. 
" See infra text accompanying notes 158-63. 
The term estoppel is chosen to reflect the concept that the liens, although unassertable 
during a limitation proceeding, should revive if the limitation proceeding falls apart. The main 
point to be emphasized here is that in priority battles with nonlimitation liens, the limitation 
liens should always lose, so long as the limitation proceeding is alive. 
Recent cases avoid the issue. See In re Zebroid Trawling Corp., 428 F.2d 226, 228-29 (1st 
Cir. 1970) (liens given effect in the limitation proceeding only); In re Moore, 278 F. Supp. 260, 
265 n.8 (E.D. Mich. 1968) (lien status of limitation claimants "premature at this time"). 
See Rodeo Marine Servs., Inc. v. Migliaccio, 651 F.2d 1101 (5th Gir. 1981) (discussed infra 
text accompanying notes 130-65). 
" FED. R. GIV. P. SUPP. F(8). 
The troublesome language from Rule F(8) appeared in the original admiralty rule which 
the Supreme Court promulgated in 1871. See Rule 55, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) xiii (1871) (super­
seded). 
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First, a limitation claimant has almost no lien rights left after the 
Limitation Act is given effect. They have no priority against other 
claimants in a limitation proceeding and are restrained by injunction 
from joining an in rem proceeding elsewhere. This latter loss is partic­
ularly acute when the vessel owner has set up the limitation proceed­
ing on the basis of a bond. In such a case, the vessel is still sailing 
about susceptible to arrest by any lienholder not enjoined from leaving 
the limitation proceeding. The only possible use the limitation claim­
ant may have for a maritime priority arises when the vessel owner has 
surrendered the vessel to the limitation court. In a surrender case, the 
nonlimitation lienholders must intervene in the limitation proceeding 
in order to get at the vessel to which their liens attach. Only in this 
circumstance can a priority battle occur. 
Since this is the only situation to which the language from Rule 
F(8) can possibly apply, we may note that, according to Rule F(8), 
claimants share pro rata in the fund but that parties are not to be 
denied their maritime lien priority. Rule F(8) is consistent, therefore, 
with a doctrine of estoppel: claimants share pro rata in the fund, but 
parties who are not claimants under the Limitation Act (i.e., nonlimi­
tation lienholders) do not share pro rata. As will be shown, these two 
propositions are hopelessly inconsistent unless it is true that the limita­
tion claimants are "legally entitled" to no liens at all. It is unlikely that 
the Supreme Court intended by this language to condemn the admi­
ralty courts to sort out the circularity problems which otherwise arise 
in maritime priorities. The concept of estoppel is so easy to administer 
and is so entirely fair to the parties that the Supreme Court cannot 
possibly have intended to preclude such a solution in light of the 
ambiguous language in Rule F(8).®® 
Having done our best with Rule F(8), we proceed to examine the 
priority problems created by competition between limitation liens and 
nonlimitation liens and also to discuss the fairness of an estoppel. But 
first, we need to say a word or two about liens antecedent to the 
limitation voyage, perhaps the most common type of lien not subject 
to the Limitation Act. 
" The language from Rule F(8) may be disregarded for another reason. Whether the 
Limitation Act destroys the limitation liens by implication is a question of congressional intent. If 
Congress did intend destruction of these liens, nothing in a court rule could possibly contravene 
this intent. In addition, the exact language states that "parties" shall be preserved the priority to 
which they are "legally entitled." If they are not legally entitled to any priority at all (because the 
Limitation Act has repealed their priority for the duration of the limitation proceeding), then 
Rule F(8) saves to limitation claimants nothing at all. 
1982] LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 275 
IV. ANTECEDENT MARITIME LIEN CLAIMANTS AND 
THE LIMITATION FUND 
As has been stated, a vessel owner may seek to limit his liability 
only when claims against him during a single voyage exceed the value 
of the vessel and freight.'''' Thus, antecedent claimants—those whose 
claims predate the limitation voyage—end up in a position much 
superior to that of creditors who can be compelled to intervene in the 
limitation proceeding. First, antecedent lienholders may always pur­
sue their in personam claims against the vessel owner,'' until such 
time as bankruptcy or a statute of limitations"' alters their rights. 
Second, since prior claimants may not be compelled to enter into the 
limitation proceeding, they are not deprived of their maritime liens. If 
they can find the vessel, they can arrest it. 
Whatever problems may arise from priority battles between an­
tecedent lienholders and limitation claimants, it is clear they exist only 
when the vessel owner opts to surrender the vessel to the limitation 
court. Only then do antecedent lienholders have cause to intervene in 
a limitation proceeding. When the vessel owner posts a bond in lieu of 
surrender, the priority battle cannot occur. Therefore, we must distin­
guish between surrender cases, on the one hand, and bond-posting 
cases on the other. 
In bond-posting cases, the vessel is not physically handed over to 
a trustee, and so it may still be pursued by in rem process. And 
because the prior claim may not be subject to limitation, the prior 
claimant can pursue the vessel owner in personam at his leisure. 
Where the bond is executed for the benefit of the limitation claimants, 
the antecedent lienholders may not intervene and claim the bond 
proceeds, since the bond and the vessel are not equivalent in terms of 
lien rights.'" 
Furthermore, section 185 of the Act clearly reads that the 
amount of the bond must cover the value of the vessel plus freight and 
other required amounts. Courts have had no trouble ruling that the 
value of the vessel means its unencumbered value.Indeed, where a 
™ La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95, 135 (1908); The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 491 (1886). 
" Cokey v. Fort, 44 F. 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1890). 
" E.g., 46 U.S.C. § 763(a) (Supp. Ill 1979) (three years for personal Injury or death); 46 
U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1976) (one year for COCSA cargo claims). If no statute of limitations applies, 
maritime claims are limited by the doctrine of laches. G. GILMOBE & G. BLACK, supra note 1, § 
9-79. 
C f .  Hawgood & Avery Transit Co. v. Dlngman, 94 F. 1011 (8th Clr. 1899) (bond In an In 
rem case executed for those who already had Interceded In the case; new claimant not a party to 
the bond had to pursue the vessel, which, thanks to the bond, was still at large). 
"[A] stipulation must be filed to protect the limitation claimant In the amount of the value 
of the vessel. To do any less would mean that petitioner Is limiting claims beyond the authority of 
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preferred ship mortgage is in the picture, or where there are large tort 
or collision liens antedating the limitation voyage, the value of the 
vessel owner's interest could be nil if the courts considered only the 
vessel owner's equity interest after the liens are given effect. In addi­
tion, where the antecedent lien amounts are unliquidated—as would 
be the case with torts not reduced to judgment—it would be impos­
sible to calculate the vessel owner's remaining equity in his vessel after 
encumbrances. Finally, reduction of the bonded amounts for anteced­
ent liens would be a windfall to the vessel owner simply because he 
has not paid his debts when due. A vessel owner may not reduce the 
limitation fund below the unencumbered value of the vessel for such 
an illegitimate reason.^® For these reasons, the amount covered by 
the bond must equate with the unencumbered value of the vessel, plus 
earned freight. The application of this rule in bond cases preserves all 
legitimate expectations of the parties. Antecedent lienholders may 
proceed against the vessel at will. Limitation claimants need not share 
the limitation fund with nonlimitation claims. The vessel owner pays 
what Congress intended—the value of the vessel at the end of the 
voyage, plus earned freight. 
The "surrender" cases pose more difficult problems because they 
raise the possibility of a priority battle with antecedent liens. Thus, if 
the vessel is surrendered "as encumbered," who, between the limita-
the statute." In re Zebroid Trawling Corp., 428 F.2d 226, 229 (1st Cir. 1970); In re Pacific Bulk 
Carriers, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 1145, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); The H.F. Dimock, 186 F. 662, 663 
(S.D.N.Y. 1910); In re The U.S. Grant, 45 F. 642, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1891); The Giles Loring, 48 F. 
463, 473 (D. Me. 1890). 
" To be distinguished from the requirement that the vessel owner is liable for the unencum­
bered value of the vessel (plus freight) is the process by which the vessel is valued at the end of the 
voyage. The value must reflect the state of the vessel after a collision, if the collision ends the 
voyage. Thus, in The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 471 (1886), the guilty vessel was salvaged 
from the ocean bottom and was brought to New York, where it had a value of $25,000. The 
owner, however, had spent $22,500 in recovering the vessel. The Commissioner appointed to 
appraise the value of the vessel took his task to be ascertaining the value prior to salvage and just 
after the collision, which was found to be the "end" of the voyage. The Commissioner simply 
subtracted the cost of recovery ($22,500) from the value of the salvaged vessel ($25,000) to arrive 
at the value of the vessel after the collision ($2,500). In this case, the unencumbered value of the 
vessel was only $2,500, not $25,000, so it may not be said that the vessel owner contributed the 
"encumbered" value. It is true, however, that, if the vessel itself had been surrendered, the 
owner (as subrogee to the salvage or repair lienholders) would have received $22,500 before the 
limitation claimants received anything. Justice Bradley defended this result on the basis that the 
$22,500 was "value added" after the voyage had ended. Id. at 493 ("[I]t enables the owner to lay 
out money in recovering and repairing the ship, without increasing the burden to which he is 
subjected."); see id. at 493, 502. The vessel owner's receipt of $22,500 must be taken as evidence 
that those who provided the recovery services have a maritime lien priority over the limitation 
claimants. These liens, to which the vessel owner is subrogated, are "subsequent" liens not 
subject to the Limitation Act. See infra text accompanying notes 165-70. 
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tion claimants and the antecedent lienholders, will first be paid out of 
the proceeds from the sale of the vessel?''® 
The implications of this question must be emphasized. If prior 
claimants are permitted to take 100% of their claims off the top 
before the limitation claimants are entitled to divide the remaining 
proceeds, the limitation fund, of course, is greatly threatened with 
reduction. And, as stated above, these antecedent liens will almost 
always be of a status inferior to those which the limitation claimants 
could assert, if the petition for limitation were not allowed, i.e., the 
antecedent liens will be first in time or will be in a category below the 
tort liens usually found in a limitation proceeding. In addition, un­
healthy commercial incentives might be created if the limitation fund 
were to be reduced by the obligation to satisfy 100 % of the antecedent 
liens from the proceeds generated by the sale of the vessel. If this were 
the rule, a vessel owner benefits greatly by surrendering the vessel 
whenever prior claims are substantial. Surrender of the vessel would 
not end the vessel owner's in personam liability to prior claimants, but 
where the vessel owner is on the brink of insolvency (a circumstance 
clearly suggested by the existence of large outstanding liens), the prior 
claimants would be forced to pursue the vessel and not the vessel 
owner. This is especially true because the limitation proceeding in­
volves an in rem sale of the vessel which wipes it free of all unasserted 
maritime liens.Thus, the limitation fund is the last chance that 
antecedent lienholders will have to foreclose.''® It can be seen, then, 
that a vessel owner could arrange for the limitation fund to discharge 
antecedent claims, at the expense of the limitation claimants,''® many 
of whom are literally quite likely to be widows and orphans.®® 
This was the precise question presented in Rodeo Marine Servs., Inc. v. Migliaccio, 651 
F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1981). 
" See infra text accompanying notes 178-90. 
" The Pelotas, 21 F.2d 236 (E.D. La. 1927), is not to the contrary. There, a limitation fund 
was to be established by surrender of the vessel. A claimant with a lien subsequent to the voyage 
caused the vessel to be arrested before an in rem sale but after the surrender. The vessel owner 
bailed the vessel, so that it could be sold in the limitation proceeding, and then sought to dismiss 
the libel in rem on the grounds that property in custodia legis could not be libeled. The proper 
procedure, said the vessel owner, was for the subsequent lienholder to intervene in the limitation 
proceeding. The court found it unnecessary to consider these excellent arguments, in that the 
subsequent lienholder was proceeding against the bond posted by the vessel owner, not against 
the vessel itself. It is respectfully submitted that, if the vessel owner had not so hastily posted the 
bond, the subsequent lienholder would have been forced to intervene in the limitation proceed­
ing. A maritime lienholder should not be able to arrest a vessel already within the court's 
jurisdiction. 
" This curious transfer of responsibility from the vessel owner to the tort victims (and others) 
in the limitation proceeding would not occur—at least for the personal injury and wrongful 
death claimants—when the Loss of Life amendments apply. As stated earlier, the $60 per ton 
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It is universally agreed that antecedent liens should not reduce 
the limitation fund," and the Act is at least consistent with that view. 
Section 183(a)" limits liability to the value of the owner s vessel and 
freight This ought to be taken to mean the owner's interest irrespect­
ive of the encumbrances which always float about the vessel m the 
maritime business.®' 
The question thus presents itself: In a surrender case, how can we 
allow the surrender of the vessel, preserve lien status of nonlimitation 
claimants, and still provide the limitation claimants with a fund equal 
to the full unencumbered value of the vessel? 
V. THE GILMORE AND RLACK ANSWER 
In order to prevent antecedent lien claimants from reducing the 
limitation fund, Gilmore and Black endorse a rule whereby the vessel 
owner's right to file a petition for limitation of liability is made 
contingent upon discharge of all antecedent liens.®^ Such a condition 
precedent was required by a few courts in the last century,®® and other 
admiralty treatises assert the rule without question. 
fund provided by these amendments comes into existence when the and 
when the portion of the limitation fund which the per»nal 
would get does not amount to $60 per registered ton of the vessel. 46 U S.C. § IM^), {c) (197b ^ 
If their share is less than $60 per ton, then the Loss of Life amendments provide that their share 
shall be increased to $60 per ton. The part of that fund which comes from the sale of Ae ves^l 
personrinjury claimants' share of the proceeds of the original l--tation fund 
Applying this learning to prior lien claimants, whatever portion of the vessel they can Uke 
in satisfaction of their liens will not affect the personal injury claimants. As v^ue of the v^l 
d^i SLse of prior encumbrances, the vessel owner would be compelled to -nUib^ 
additional money to the personal injury fund to guarantee that it equals exactly $60 per 
registemd ton. ^ ^ ^^6 (1st Cir. 1970) (widow's wrongful death 
id. at 229; In re Pacific Bulk Carriers, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 1145, f 
1975) (bond amount and surrender amount should be identical); The PelotM, 21 F.2d 236, 239 
IS S 1927)° The H.F. Dimock, 186 F. 662, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) (same); G. Gilmore & G. 
Black, supra note 1, § 10-48. 
» tL Git on?om\S U.S. 468, 492-93 (1886) (the standards for bond-posting and 
surrender cases ought to be the same). 
84 Gilmore & G. Black, supra note 1, §1-. j,,. uj4ii? ftir 
»» E a In re The U.S. Grant, 45 F. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1891); The Leonard Richards, 41 F. ̂ 8 
(D.N.I.'l890). It is not clear that either of these cases involve surrender of 
condition precedent rule seems to have been applied Uhina 
Andersen & Go., 364 F.2d 769, 792 (5th Gir. 1966) iT94b) rHuoHi^SBOOK or 
3 E. Benedict, The American Admiralty 458 (6th ed. 194u), k. nouH , 
Admiralty Law § 186 (2d ed. 1920); G. Robinson, Handbook of Admiralty Law 
United States 928-30 (1939). 
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It is universally agreed that antecedent liens should not reduce 
the limitation fund,®' and the Act is at least consistent with that view. 
Section 183(a) limits liability to the value of the owner's vessel and 
freight. This ought to be taken to mean the owner's interest irrespect­
ive of the encumbrances which always float about the vessel in the 
maritime business.®® 
The question thus presents itself: In a surrender case, how can we 
allow the surrender of the vessel, preserve lien status of nonlimitation 
claimants, and still provide the limitation claimants with a fund equal 
to the full unencumbered value of the vessel? 
V. THE GILMORE AND BLACK ANSWER 
In order to prevent antecedent lien claimants from reducing the 
limitation fund, Gilmore and Black endorse a rule whereby the vessel 
owner's right to file a petition for limitation of liability is rnade 
contingent upon discharge of all antecedent liens.®^ Such a condition 
precedent was required by a few courts in the last century,®® and other 
admiralty treatises assert the rule without question.® 
fund provided by these amendments comes into existence when the vessel is ^angoing and 
when the portion of the limitation fund which the personal injury and 
would get does not amount to $60 per registered ton of the vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 183(h), (c) (1976). 
If their share is less than $60 per ton, then the Loss of Life amendments provide that their share 
shall he increased to $60 per ton. The part of that fund which comes from the sale of the vessel 
depends upon the personal injury claimants' share of the proceeds of the original limitation fund. 
Applying this learning to prior lien claimants, whatever portion of the vessel they can take 
in satisfaction of their liens wiU not affect the personal injury claimants. As the value of the v^el 
declines because of prior encumbrances, the vessel owner would he compelled to contribute 
additional money to the personal injury fund to guarantee that it equals exactly $60 per 
regirtered torn brawling Corp., 428 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1970) (widow's wrongful death 
»' Le id. at 229; In re Pacific Bulk Carriers, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 1145, 1148-49 
1975) (bond amount and surrender amount should he identical); The Pelotas, 21 F.2d 236, 
(E.D. La. 1927); The H.F. Dimock, 186 F. 662, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) (same); G. Gilmore & C. 
Black, supra note 1, § 10-48. 
«« 46 U.S.G. § 183(a) (1976). , , r l j A 
" See The Gity of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 492-93 (1886) (the standards for bond-posting and 
surrender cases ought to he the same). 
M G. Gilmore & G. Black, supra note 1, § 10-48. . u j ..i c 8i« 
E.g., In re The U.S. Grant, 45 F. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1891); The Leonard Richards, 41 F. 818 
(D N T. 1890). It is not clear that either of these cases involve surrender of the vessel. The 
condition precedent rule seems to have been applied i" China Union Lin^ Ltd_ v. . . 
Andersen & Go., 364 F.2d 769, 792 (5th Gir. 1966), cert, dented, 386 U.S. 933 (1967). 
st 3 E. BEKEiiicr, The Ammcan aommaltv 458 (6th ed. 1940); R. Hughes, Handbook of 
Admiralty Law § 186 (2d ed. 1920); G. Robinson, Handbook of Admiralty Law in the 
United States 928-30 (1939). 
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Although Gilmore and Black admit that authority is "scant, 
they set forth reasons in support of the condition precedent. The 
existence of antecedent claims, they note, implies that the vessel 
owner is on the brink of insolvency. The vessel owner, therefore, will 
soon be out of business. The purpose of the Limitation Act, however, 
is to keep vessel owners in business who would otherwise be ruined by 
liability from a major disaster. There is no purpose to applying the 
benefits of the Limitation Act, they say, to an owner who is insolvent. 
If the condition precedent rule were to be the law, limitation petitions 
by insolvent vessel owners would have to be denied for failure to meet 
the condition precedent. With the demise of the limitation proceed­
ing, the limitation claimants would be free to pursue the vessel in an 
in rem action where they could assert their natural lien priorities. 
They can also share with antecedent claimants—and nonmaritime 
general creditors—in the bankrupt estate.®® 
The rationale offered by Gilmore and Black—the sabotage of 
limitation proceedings for insolvent vessel owners—leads them to the 
position that the condition precedent rule should be applied both in 
cases where the vessel owner establishes the limitation fund by posting 
a bond and in cases where the fund is established by surrendering the 
vessel.®® In either case, the condition precedent rule stands, in their 
view, as an obstable which an insolvent party would be hard pressed 
to overcome. 
The basic premise of Gilmore and Black—that insolvent vessel 
owners will be prevented from limiting liability—can be faulted for 
" G. Gilmore & G. Black, supra note 1, § 10-48, at 950. 
»» Id. at 952. Gilmore and Black make an uncustomary error when they assume that a tort 
claimant freed from a limitation proceeding would have a high priority claim in bankruptcy and 
could therefore take precedence over ship mortgagees. See id. at 954 ("Apart from the limitation 
proceeding, the widow could claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for the unpaid balance of her 
judgment and, since her claim is based on a high-order maritime lien, would in all probability be 
given priority over the claims of competing creditors . . . ."); see also id. § 10-40, at 933 
(nonlimitation claimants can pursue assets other than the vessel in bankruptcy, where "they may 
be expected to come out with priority over most competing claims"); id. § 10-48, at 955 (general 
creditors would be subordinated to the widow's high-priority claim "on one theory or another"). 
I am sure that, under cross-examination, they would quickly concede that the widow's high-
priority maritime lien is in the vessel and, perhaps, freight, not in the bankrupt estate. Since 
vessel owner estates consist largely of freight past earned, a clever maritime claimant may some 
day argue that a lien priority on freight is essentially a lien priority on the estate itself, but sucb 
an argument runs into the holding of Schirmer Stevedoring Co. v. Seaboard Stevedoring Corp., 
306 F.2d 188 (9th Gir. 1962) (the lien attaches only to the freight earned from the voyage on 
which the secured claim arose). Absent such contrivances, no special priorities attach to mari­
time claims in bankruptcy. See generally Landers, The Shipowner Becomes a Bankrupt, 39 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 490 (1972). 
" See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 10-48, at 952 n.212. 
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overlooking the obvious impact of insurance. Elsewhere in their trea­
tise, Gilmore and Black assure us that most vessel owners carry liabil­
ity insurance.®" To the insurance company, it makes a great deal of 
difference whether limitation of liability is available or not.®' There­
fore, if the condition precedent is accepted as the law, insurance 
companies will discharge the prior liens themselves where the net 
result is a savings to them.®'' 
There is a better rationale for the condition precedent rule than 
that offered by Gilmore and Black. The condition precedent of dis­
charging all antecedent liens would guarantee that the limitation 
claimants will get the full amount of the limitation fund without 
having to share it with antecedent lienholders. If the antecedent 
lienholders must be paid off before the limitation proceeding can 
begin, all danger that their liens will reduce the fund disappears. 
This stronger justification—preservation of the limitation fund 
for the limitation claimants—leads to a narrower scope of the condi­
tion precedent rule. To preserve the limitation fund, the rule need be 
applied only in the surrender cases, not the bond-posting cases. In the 
bond-posting cases, courts have always held that the amount guaran­
teed by the bond must represent the full unencumbered value of the 
vessel.®" When this amount is posted, the limitation claimants have 
received all the benefits the Limitation Act gives them. The anteced­
ent lienholders have no claim on the limitation funds in such a case. 
Their liens lie against the vessel, which is still at large, thanks to the 
posting of the bond. Therefore, no need exists to require that nonlimi-
tation liens be discharged.®^ 
Id. § 2-1; see also Keen v. Overseas Tankership Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1952) 
("Substantially all maritime risks are insured . . . 
" But see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 417 (1954) (plurality opinion). 
Under Louisiana's unique provision for direct actions against insurance companies, the insurers 
would be indifferent to the vessel owner's ability to limit liability. According to the procedure set 
forth in the Maryland Casualty opinion, the insurance company must make the vessel owner 
good for the value of the vessel and earned freight (i.e., the limitation fund established by the 
vessel owner) and then must contribute the balance of the covered amount to the limitation 
claimants. Its liability is not therefore lessened if the vessel owner limits liability. See generally 
Buglass, Limitation of Liability from a Marine Insurance Viewpoint, 53 TOL. L. REV. 1363, 
1388 (1979). Outside Louisiana, the benefit to insurers is clear. Id. at 1364 (insurance premiums 
would increase up to 30% but for the Limitation Act). 
See In re Zebroid Trawling Corp., 428 F.2d 226, 229 (1st Cir. 1970) (obligations that 
accrued prior to voyage remain unaffected by limitation proceeding); China Union Lines, Ltd. 
V. A. O. Andersen & Co., 364 F.2d 769, 792 (5th Cir. 1966) ("It was to its advantage, and the 
advantage of its underwriters, to free the [vessel] of the Government's statutory [and nonlimita-
tion] lien, and secure the decree of injunction."). 
" See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. 
" Where the vessel is completely lost, and where there is no earned freight and no personal 
injury fund, no bond need be filed. In re The Boat Camden, Inc., 569 F.2d 1072 (1st Cir. 1978). 
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In the surrender cases, the condition precedent rule is an absolute 
necessity. When the vessel owner surrenders the vessel, the rights of 
the antecedent lienholders lie against the vessel which is the founda­
tion of the limitation fund, and their liens still attach to the fund after 
the in rem sale of the vessel. These lienholders must therefore be 
discharged prior to a limitation proceeding. The condition precedent 
rule may therefore safely be limited to the surrender cases. Here, and 
only here, the antecedent lienholders threaten the integrity of the 
limitation fund.®® 
In large part because they extend the condition precedent rule to 
the bond-posting cases, Gilmore and Black feel that the decision in 
F/F Zebroid^^ stands in the way of their condition precedent rule. 
They read this case as barring the condition precedent altogether in 
limitation proceedings.®'' Granted, the opinions in Zebroid are more 
than a little opaque,®® but a close reading of them yields the conclu­
sion that the court of appeals never intended to obliterate the condi­
tion precedent rule, as Gilmore and Black supposed. In fact, the court 
draws the distinction and rests upon the rationale that I have asserted 
to be superior: The condition precedent rule does not extend to bond-
posting cases, because the existence of antecedent liens does not 
threaten to reduce the limitation fund. In bond cases, the court as­
sumes, the bond amount must cover the unencumbered value of the 
vessel.®® But in surrender cases, where antecedent liens threaten the 
In such a case, it is sufficient if the vessel owner merely offers to make good on any sum required 
by the Limitation Act. Oil Transp. Co. v. Verret, 278 F.2d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1960), vacated as 
moot, 365 U.S. 768 (1961); see Staring, supra note 40, at 1145. With regard to the condition 
precedent of discharging antecedent liens, no interest of the limitation claimants would be served 
by imposing such a rule when there is no limitation fund to protect. Therefore, this case should 
be treated like the bond-posting cases: No condition precedent rule applies. 
Limitation of liability under the Act not only gives rise to a limitation proceeding, where 
the vessel owner can cause a concursus after establishing a fund, but it also may be pleaded as a 
defense in and out of admiralty. Thus, a vessel owner faced with a large claim can plead 
exoneration beyond the value of the vessel and earned freight. The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 33-34 
(1882); Pelaez, A Trip Through the Looking Glass—Asserting the Right to Limit Liability in 
Admiralty, 19 Dug. L. REV. 265, 308-09 (1981). Obviously, the condition precedent rule has no 
place in a defensive pleading of the Limitation Act. The purpose of the rule is to guarantee the 
integrity of the limitation fund in the concursus. A vessel owner whose petition for limitation of 
liability is dismissed for failure to discharge antecedent or other nonlimitation liens may there­
fore still plead limitation of liability as a defensive matter. 
1970 A.M.C. 113 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd sub nom. In re Zebroid Trawling Corp., 428 F.2d 
226 (1st Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the Zebroid decision, see supra text accompanying notes 
37-40. 
" G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-48, at 953. 
"The facts of The Zebroid, so far as they can be determined from the two brief opinions 
which were delivered in the case, are obscure and some aspects of the holding are, at least to this 
writer, equally obscure." Id. at 952. 
See infra text accompanying note 127. 
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limitation fund, the court rules that the vessel owner may not permit 
the limitation fund to be reduced by antecedent liens. In citing 
some condition precedent cases in this context, the court actually 
endorses the condition precedent rule, but only when the vessel is 
surrendered.^®^ Thus, Zebroid, in my view, was correctly decided 
and consistent with what the law ought to be. 
Unfortunately, Zebroid has been misunderstood not only by 
Gilmore and Black but by the Fifth Circuit.'®^ Both supposed Ze­
broid to stand against the condition precedent rule in any context. For 
this reason, a careful exegesis will be useful. 
The story begins on January 4, 1968, when Captain Manchester 
of the Zebroid was washed overboard five days out of Newport, 
Rhode Island. On April 10, 1968, the preferred ship mortgagee, an 
antecedent lienholder, caused the Zebroid's arrest in order to foreclose 
its mortgage.^®® The vessel was sold for $45,000, which was paid into 
the admiralty court registry and became the in rem fund.'®^ 
On May 22, 1968, Manchester's widow intervened, asserting her 
tort lien, which was superior to that of the mortgagee.^®® Her claim 
was sufficiently large that it exceeded the value of the Zebroid 
($45,000), hence entitling the Zebroid Trawling Corp., owner of the 
vessel, to limit liability. Accordingly, the vessel owner filed its petition 
for limitation of liability on July 3, 1968, asking in an ex parte motion 
that the in rem fund be used as the limitation fund.'®® On December 
31, 1968, the limitation court (per Judge Carrity) agreed, and there­
fore ordered the in rem fund transferred to the limitation proceed­
ing.'®'' The court also ordered the widow to halt litigation in any 
other forum other than the limitation proceeding.'®® The limitation 
proceeding had therefore weighed anchor and was underway. 
The mortgagee, however, was now left without a res upon which 
to execute. It was forced, therefore, to intervene in the limitation 
proceeding to protest the transfer of the in rem fund. Upon the 
See infra text accompanying note 125. 
"" See infra text accompanying note 124. 
Rodeo Marine Servs., Inc. v. Migliaccio, 651 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1981). After ruling that 
there is no statutory justification for the condition precedent rule, the Rodeo court stated, "We 
believe this holding comports with the reason of the First Circuit in . . . The Zebroid . . . ."Id. 
at 1106. For a discussion of the Rodeo decision, see infra text accompanying notes 130-65. 
In re Zebroid Trawling Corp., 428 F.2d 226, 227 (1st Cir. 1970). 
"» Id. 
Id. 
1970 A.M.C. at 114. 
"" Id. 
">' 428 F.2d at 227. 
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mortgagee's motion, Judge Garrity repented, and his narrow holding 
was that the transfer order should be reversed.^"® His dicta were a 
good deal broader than his holding, however. Judge Garrity noted 
that since the Zebroid had been sold in the in rem proceeding, the 
Zebroid Trawling Gorp. was a "former" vessel owner. Only current 
vessel owners could limit liability. Judge Garrity thought, not a 
former owner, and especially not a bankrupt former owner. 
Ironically, Judge Garrity relied upon the very policy of Gilmore and 
Black which was discussed above: "Unless, after a limitation decree, 
the owner is in a position to continue operating his ships, there is no 
reason to grant limitation in the first place.""' The irony is that 
whereas Gilmore and Black make this statement in support of the 
condition precedent rule. Judge Garrity bootstrapped this statement 
into a revolutionary new legal principle: that former vessel owners 
could never limit liability, since they would not be continuing to 
operate their ships. 
Judge Garrity also felt that the transfer of the in rem fund 
"would conflict with the well-settled rule that prior liens on the vessel 
must be independently paid or secured""®—i.e., the condition prece­
dent rule. What he must have meant by this is that if the transfer were 
allowed, the mortgagee would have no choice but to intervene in the 
limitation proceeding, because that was where the res was located. In 
the limitation proceeding, the vessel owner would have to discharge 
the lien because of the condition precedent rule, since the vessel owner 
must always contribute "the value of the whole vessel to the limita­
tion fund."® Judge Garrity's logic in this regard is not completely 
seaworthy. Judge Garrity did not really address the issue of why the 
transfer should not have taken place. A more direct answer would 
have been preferable: The transfer should not have taken place be­
cause the owner's right to surrender the vessel is lost when an anteced­
ent lienholder has caused the vessel to be arrested.'" 
The court of appeals, led by Judge Aldrich, affirmed on the 
narrow grounds upon which Judge Garrity had ruled: the transfer of 
109 "The libellant in the foreclosure action, [the] First National Bank of Cape Cod, moved in 
this case to intervene and for revocation of the order of December 31, 1968." 1970 A.M.C. at 
114. "The intervener's motion is allowed and the court's order entered December 31, 1968, is 
revoked." Id. at 115. 
"" Id. at 114. 
"1 Id. (citing C. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 10-49, 747-48 (1st ed. 
1957)). 
'"i Id. at 115. 
Id. 
See supra text accompanying notes 93-95 and 98-101. 
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the in rem fund was inappropriate."® In affirming. Judge Aldrich 
disagreed, quite rightly, that former owners could never limit liabil­
ity. Indeed they could. Judge Aldrich thought,"® and so ended Judge 
Garrity's revolutionary attempt to remake limitation law. 
Judge Aldrich, however, affirmed on Judge Garritys second 
ground, which had been based loosely on the condition precedent 
rule. In doing so. Judge Aldrich shed some additional light on what 
this second ground was. 
The vessel owner had argued to the court of appeals that, but for 
the limitation proceeding, the mortgagee would have lost out to the 
widow. Even if the in rem fund were to be transferred to the limita­
tion fund, the lien priorities of each would survive, and the mortgagee 
would still lose. Therefore, concluded the vessel owner, the mortgagee 
was not harmed when the in rem fund was transferred." 
This argument was deemed by Judge Aldrich to be a misconcep­
tion.""® The meaning of the Limitation Act, he said, was that 
limitation liens had to be enforced in the limitation proceeding and 
nowhere else."® To these limitation liens, the vessel owner must 
tender the full value of the vessel."® Rut antecedent liens could not 
be affected by the injunction of the limitation court, which forces the 
The bank then moved for leave to intervene in the limitation proceeding. Its motion 
was allowed, and after hearing the court revoked its previous allowance of Trawl-
ing's motion to apply the fund in the registry of the court as security. Trawling 
appeals. ... We affirm on a restatement of [Judge Garritys] second ground. 
428 F.2d at 227-28. 
I d .  at 228. , ^ , 
This restatement of Zebroid Trawling Corp.'s argument is drawn from this language: 
Trawling argues that since the widow's claim has priority over the bank [i.e., the 
mortgagee] and the other lienor. Trawling has a right to have the court assign the 
sale proceeds to the widow's account in the limitation proceeding. Trawling says 
that if her claim is valid these lienors, being inferior, will be wiped out, and if not, 
they will not be hurt. . . 
I d  The "other lienor" seems to be the Neptune Oil Corp., whose attorney is listed as prraent at 
the oral argument in the district court. 170 A.M.C. 113, 114 (D. Mass. 1969). Presumably, this 
claimant had a supply lien, which would be inferior to the widow s hen and to the mortgagee s 
lien Under 46 U.S.C. § 953(a) (1976), preferred ship mortgages take precedence over su^ly 
liens which accrue after recordation of the mortgage and indorsement of the mortgage on ship s 
papers. 
"8 428 F.2d at 228. , , . . . j -
119 "The right to limit claims to the value of the vessel applies only to the claims arising during 
the one voyage .... Liens attaching during the voyage will be subject to limitation, but this is 
to be effected in the court proceedings." Id. at 228-29 (citations omitted). 
i!"" "Such liens are not to be 'independently paid,' but, rather, the full value of the vessel mus 
be tendered into court." Id. at 229. 
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concursus.^^^ And "not affected" must mean that the in rem fund 
could not be transferred.'^^ 
The last paragraph of Judge Aldrich's opinion is crucial. He 
begins by saying that the "basic principle" on which his opinion rests is 
"universally accepted." That is why, he says, "there is little decisional 
authority" for it."" Unfortunately he did not specify what the "basic 
principle" was upon which everyone is supposedly in agreement, but 
he does cite two cases which assert the condition precedent rule.'^" 
Therefore, I opine that the "basic principle" upon which such univer­
sal harmony exists must be this: Whenever there are outstanding 
antecedent liens which threaten the right of limitation claimants to 
receive the unencumbered value of the vessel, the vessel owner must 
discharge them as a condition precedent to a limitation proceeding. 
"To do any less," says Judge Aldrich, "would mean that petitioner is 
limiting claims beyond the authority of the statute."'^® Based on this 
universal principle. Judge Aldrich gives procedural advice with regard 
to the future of Zebroid Trawling Corp.'s limitation proceeding: "Ap­
plied to the case at bar this does not mean that petitioner, or its 
insurer, must pay off prior [i.e., antecedent] liens, but merely that a 
stipulation must be filed to protect the limitation claimant in the 
amount of the value of the vessel."'^® 
To summarize, if I have read Zebroid correctly, the First Circuit 
does not oppose the condition precedent rule in general. It approves of 
the rule for surrender cases. Its sole policy justification is just what it 
should be: preservation of the limitation fund for the limitation claim­
ants. This policy does not require the condition precedent rule for the 
bond-posting cases, since the vessel owner must post the amount 
representing the unencumbered value of the vessel.'^'' The First Cir­
cuit explicitly rejected the Gilmore and Black argument that the 
limitation proceeding should be sabotaged if it does not serve to keep 
the vessel owner in business.'^® The condition precedent rule, in its 
"However, obligations which accrued prior to the voyage, not being subject to limitation, 
remain unaffected by the proceeding." Id. 
"Since vis-a-vis the owner they do not stand to be reduced, it must follow that he cannot 
throw the security interests of those lienors into the pot." Id. 
1" Id. 
The opinions cited by Judge Aldrich are In re The U.S. Grant, 45 F. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1891); 
Fort V. Cokey, 44 F. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1890). 
428 F.2d at 229. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Id. at 228 ("[T]he 'value of the owner's interest' refers to the ship in specie . . . and not 
simply to his equitable interest . . . .") (citations omitted). 
Id. ("We do not accept that reasoning. The purpose of the Act is to encourage the 
investment in ships, not simply to provide for its continuance."). 
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narrower and more appropriate version, is therefore alive and pros­
perous after Zebroid. 
A final piece of evidence may be offered for the proposition that 
the condition precedent of discharging outstanding liens exists for 
surrender cases only. Supplemental Rule F(2) requires all liens to be 
set forth in the petition for limitation of liability, whether they be 
limitation liens or nonlimitation liens, but the requirement exists only 
if the vessel owner elects to proceed by surrendering the vessel. No 
such list is required for bond-posting cases. This difference in require­
ments is consistent with the view that the condition precedent exists 
only for the surrender cases, not the bond-posting cases. 
VI. THE RODCO PROCEDURE 
A much more formidable obstacle to the condition precedent rule 
appeared recently in Rodco Marine Services, Inc. v. Migliaccio,^^° 
where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the 
condition precedent rule in surrender cases could not be sustained, 
due to lack of statutory support for it.'^^ In that case, the vessel 
owner and his bareboat charterer jointly expressed a desire to surren­
der the Good Boy, a towing vessel operating on the Mississippi, to a 
court-appointed trustee. The district court denied the petition for 
limitation on the grounds that undischarged antecedent encum­
brances existed on the vessel. 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that a 
condition precedent requiring satisfaction of antecedent liens did not 
exist by statute or court rule. Instead, the court of appeals, in writing 
some guidelines for the district court, indicated that the petition 
should be provisionally accepted, the vessel should be sold, and the 
proceeds should be paid into the registry of the court. The instruction 
which followed was illuminating: "The court then determines "the 
priority of the liens against the fund. If the entire fund is not available 
to the voyage claimants, distribution should be made to the proper 
lienors and the owner [should be] denied exoneration.""®^ Since the 
court's instruction stands as the most recent authority on administer­
ing the limitation fund in light of antecedent liens, it deserves our 
careful attention. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. F(2). 
651 F.2d 1101 {5th Cir. 1981). 
Id. at 1103-06. In this regard, the Rodco cxiurt erroneously read Zebroid as mandating such 
a result, see supra note 102, no doubt because that is the way Gilmore and Black read it. 
Id. at 1106. By "exoneration," the court of appeals, id. at 1103 n.4, invokes 46 U.S.C. § 
185 (1976), which states that, after surrendering the vessel and posting the required bonds "all 
claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the matter in question shall cease." 
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A. Delay of the Moment of Reckoning 
First, the court asserts that nothing in the Act conditions limita­
tion of liability upon satisfaction of antecedent liens,"® and on this 
premise, the Gilmore and Black formulation of a condition precedent 
rule for surrender cases was rejected. But in the court's procedural 
guidelines, the requirement that antecedent liens be satisfied is intro­
duced at a later stage of the proceeding. The court, then, contem­
plates (in what I shall call the "Rodeo variant") that a vessel owner 
who has not satisfied antecedent liens is nevertheless provisionally 
entitled to his limitation proceeding. The proceeding, however, will 
be dismissed if, at the point of distribution of the fund, the antecedent 
liens have not been discharged by the vessel owner. The moment of 
reckoning for the vessel owner is thereby merely delayed, perhaps for 
a considerable length of time where litigation is complex. 
The Rodeo court, then, accepts that the vessel may not be surren­
dered without at some point doing something to remove the encum­
brances. But in holding that no statutory authority exists for the 
condition precedent, the court has failed to read section 185 of the Act 
carefully. Section 185 not only authorizes but perhaps mandates the 
condition precedent. In order to see why this is true, we must reem-
phasize the premise upon which Gilmore and Black, the Zebroid court 
and even the Rodeo court agree in some form—that the Limitation 
Act affirmatively requires the discharge of antecedent liens at some 
point prior to distribution of the fund. 
Section 185 makes clear that the injunction against litigation by 
claimants in other courts shall not issue until after the vessel owner has 
either posted the bond or transferred to the trustee his interest in the 
vessel and earned freight, together with whatever other sums are 
required by the Act. If antecedent liens appear in the vessel own-
651 F.2d at 1104. 
The vessel owner . . . may petition a district court... for limitation of liability . . . 
and the owner (a) shall deposit with the court, for the benefit of claimants, a sum 
equal to the amount or value of the interest of such owner in the vessel and freight, 
or approved security therefor, and in addition such sums, or approved security 
therefor, as the court may from time to time fix as necessary to carry out the 
provisions of section 183 of this title, or (b) at his option shall transfer, for the benefit 
of claimants, to a trustee to be appointed by the court his interest in the vessel and 
freight, together with such sums, or approved security therefor, as the court may 
from time to time fix as necessary to carry out the provisions of section 183 of this 
title. Upon compliance with the requirements of this section all claims and proceed­
ings against the owner with respect to the matter in question shall cease. 
46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). 
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er's complaint,and if it is true that those liens must not reduce the 
limitation fund, then, before the concursus is ordered, the court is 
well justified in requiring that sums (or adequate security) be paid to 
the court (or otherwise discharged) to assure that the antecedent lien 
claimants will not reduce the limitation fund.^®® If the court is in the 
position to require sums or security to cover these antecedent liens, it 
may dismiss the complaint altogether if the sums are not paid or if the 
security is not posted. Obviously, this statutory mandate is breathtak-
ingly close to a requirement that antecedent liens must be discharged, 
especially if "discharge" includes the concept of paying the lien 
amounts through the court as intermediary or of posting adequate 
security with the court for such payment."^ 
In refusing to allow a condition precedent while requiring the 
Rodeo variant of discharge later in the proceeding, the Rodeo court 
also ignores an analogous instruction given by the Supreme Court in 
Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. Robert Stewart 6- Sons."® In this 
case, a collision between a Rritish and an American vessel had oc­
curred in Belgian waters. The American vessel owner petitioned for 
limitation of liability, arguing that Belgian law should apply. Under 
Belgian law, liability would have been limited to $325,000."® Under 
the Limitation Act, liability would have been $1,000,000. The district 
court dismissed for failure to post appropriate bond under section 185, 
which requires the posting of amounts equivalent to the value of the 
vessel and earned freight. 
When the Supreme Court finally received the case, it reversed 
and remanded on the choice of law question."® The choice of law. 
Under Supplemental Rule F(2), the petitioner is required to set forth all antecedent liens, 
although, as the Rodeo court noted, this provision alone is not the same as a requirement to 
discharge such liens. 651 F.2d at 1104. 
See In re Delphinus Maritima, S.A., 1981 A.M.C. 2385, 2388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("The 
posting of proper security is a condition precedent to obtaining an injunctive order . . . ."). 
See China Union Lines, Ltd. v. A. O. Andersen & Co., 364 F.2d 769, 792 n.26 (5th Cir. 
1966) (vessel owner required to deposit money equivalent to a nonlimitation lien), cert, denied, 
386 U.S. 933 (1967). 
336 U.S. 386 (1949). 
Id. at 391. 
Id. at 398-99. The rationale for reversing and remanding was necessarily confusing because 
of the bizarre court of appeals decision in the Black Diamond case. See United States v. Robert 
Steward & Sons, 167 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1948). The district court had decided that the limitation 
amount was not a substantive question (thought to be governed by the lex locus delicti as a choice 
of law) but was a remedial question governed by the law of the forum. Under American law, the 
required bond was insufficient. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed without 
making a choice of law. The court reasoned that if Relgian law applied, so that liability 
amounted to only $325,028.79, then limitation was unavailable. Limitation under the Act 
required that claims against the vessel owner exceed the value of vessel and earned freight, the 
court of appeals noted. Id. at 308-09. That could never be the case where Belgian law limited all 
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the Supreme Court noted, would determine the size of the bond 
required under section 185. Therefore it was necessary to decide the 
choice of law question as a threshold matter—a condition precedent, 
as it were—before the limitation proceeding could commence in ear­
nest: 
A proceeding to limit liability is ipso facto a proceeding to 
limit recovery, and the amount of the applicable limit, like the 
value of the vessel and freight, is a question affecting the magni­
tude of the res from which recovery is sought. It is a question, 
therefore, which lies at the threshold of all claims, is equally rele­
vant to all, and should accordingly be disposed of before any."' 
The Supreme Court certainly felt that the amount of the limitation 
fund should be decided up front. Black Diamond is authority directly 
contrary to the Rodeo variant. The Rodeo variant places the judge in 
the position of ordering a eoneursus in violation of section 185, which 
r e q u i r e s  t h a t  a l l  s u m s  m a n d a t e d  b y  t h e  A c t  m u s t ,  i f  p o s s i b l e , b e  
paid in advance. 
B. Unnecessary Denial of Jury Rights 
A second point about the procedural guideline set out in Rodeo is 
that the court seems to contemplate a metamorphosis of the unsuccess­
ful limitation proceeding into an in rem proceeding, where maritime 
lien priorities govern. If, in the Rodeo limitation proceeding, a high 
ranking antecedent lien were to appear—e.g., a salvage claim from a 
prior voyage—the limitation proceeding would change into an in rem 
proceeding, and the proceeds of the vessel would be divided according 
to maritime lien priorities, with all liens, including those incident to 
limitation claims, participating according to rank. In such a case, the 
salvage liens come first, with the most recent salvage lien taking 
priority over our hypothetical antecedent salvage lien. After salvage 
claims to a value less than the value of the vessel and freight. If Belgian law did not apply, 
dismissal was required because the required $1,000,000 bond was not filed. Id. at 309. 
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that if Belgian law applied, limitation was available 
because claims exceeded the Belgian limitation. 336 U.S. at 398. Also, dismissal for insufficient 
bond should not occur until petitioner had an ample opportunity to supply the requisite funds 
required by the court's eventual legal rulings. 
As to the ultimate choice of law, the Supreme Court held that it was to turn on whether the 
Belgian limitation was substance or procedure. Such a determination would depend upon 
findings of fact on what the nature of the Belgian law was. Id. at 395-98. Hence the remand. 
Id. at 397-98. 
Of course, the personal injury fund mandated in 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1976), cannot be 
calculated in advance. See supra note 33. 
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come the tort victims. The preferred ship mortgage, of course, would 
be last in line.^" 
On its face, the metamorphosis is appropriate. The court has sold 
the vessel in an in rem sale and has deposited the proceeds in the court 
registry. The vessel has been wiped clear of liens, and any recovery on 
the liens must be from the fund created by the limitation court. The 
lienholders, in this sense, are well served by the metamorphosis.''''' 
The difficulty with this procedure is that, at the point at which the 
limitation petition is finally dismissed for failure to pay off antecedent 
liens, the tort victims and other claimants have been forced to litigate 
in admiralty court. Any rulings by the admiralty court on the merits 
of these claims are res judicata in future actions."® Absent the in­
junction which forced them into the proceeding, these tort victims 
would have been able to pursue their remedies outside admiralty, 
where it is possible to have a jury trial."® 
There is certainly no constitutional bar to an admiralty judge 
who under the Rodeo procedure keeps all  the claimants before him 
and decides all the claims against the vessel owner."'' But the Su­
preme Court has gone to impressive lengths to preserve the right of 
plaintiffs to litigate outside admiralty under the saving to suitors 
clause, while preserving the essentials of the Limitation Act for vessel 
owners. These cases suggest strongly that the Supreme Court would 
An admiralty court could also proceed to render in personam judgments against the vessel 
owner, as well as in rem judgments against the fund, since the vessel owner has submitted 
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by filing his petition for limitation. Hartford Accident & 
Indemn. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 217 (1927). 
See The Mendota, 14 F. 358, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1882) (Benedict, J.) (approving the metamor­
phosis from limitation proceeding to in rem distribution). 
See infra note 151. 
Plaintiffs may leave the admiralty court and pursue any action elsewhere, provided they 
are entitled to a common law remedy. This is the rule of the famous "saving to suitors" clause, 
now embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976) (District courts have original and exclusive 
jurisdiction in all civil cases "of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction saving to suitors [petitioners] 
in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."). If a personal injury 
plaintiff exercises this right, he may bring his action in state court or in federal court, if he can 
make out independent grounds of federal jurisdiction. If in federal court, there is some doubt 
whether an action grounded in nonstatutory admiralty law gives rise to a seventh amendment 
jury right. Strong dicta exist to the effect that some kind of jury right exists. Atlantic & Gulf 
Stevedore v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1962) ("[S]uit being [brought] in federal 
courts by reason of diversity of citizenship carrie[s] with it, of course, the right of trial by jury."). 
In contrast limitation proceedings are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the admiralty 
court. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Even on the Great Lakes, where admiralty must provide a 
statutory jury trial, 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1976), the courts do not allow juries in actions under the 
Limitation Act. In re Great Lakes Towing Co., 395 F. Supp. 810, 812 (N.D. Ohio 1974). 
See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 216-17 (1927); 
Staring, supra note 40, at 1180. 
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look with disfavor on the Rodeo variant, which unnecessarily destroys 
the jury rights of the limitation claimants. 
In Langnes v. Green,^*^ for example, only one claim existed 
against the vessel owner. His interest in a concursus, the Supreme 
Court said, was nonexistent, although his interest in limitation of 
liability continued. The Supreme Court therefore allowed the 
plaintiff to sue outside admiralty, provided that the plaintiff refrain 
from litigating defendant's right to limit liability. Thus, the Court 
contemplated that the admiralty court would have continuing juris­
diction over the limitation proceeding. The admiralty court should 
first permit the plaintiff to obtain a judgment from a nonadmiralty 
court, where a jury right could be exercised. Next the plaintiff would 
bring the judgment to admiralty court where the limitation right of 
the vessel owner would be decided. The key element of the formula 
was that plaintiff achieve no res judicata advantage on any issue 
crucial to the defendant's right to limit liability.^®® On the other 
hand, the vessel owner was not to obtain res judicata advantages from 
the admiralty court (sitting without a jury) on his underlying liabil­
ity.'®' 
The Supreme Court went further in Lake Tankers Corp. v. 
Henn^^^ to emphasize that the Limitation Act should be narrowly 
construed to preserve plaintiffs' rights to jury trials.'®® There, the 
plaintiff stipulated that her claim, in conjunction with other known 
claims, was so low that the value of vessel and freight was not ex­
ceeded. In order to preserve the vessel owner's right to have an 
admiralty court decide whether limitation of liability existed, the 
282 U.S. 531 (1931). 
Id. at 540. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-19. 
Thus, when Green sought a ruling in his state court action that the vessel owner had 
knowledge and privity of the court, and hence no right to limit liability, the vessel owner 
obtained an injunction against further prosecution of the state action on the theory that only the 
admiralty court could decide the limitation issue. The admiralty court gave the option of 
avoiding the injunction by withdrawing the "knowledge and privity" issue from the state court 
action. Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437, 440 (1932). 
See The "Benefactor" S.S. Go. v. Mount, 103 U.S. 239, 243 (1880) (judgment outside the 
limitation proceeding res judicata within the proceeding); Moore-McGormack Lines, Inc. v. 
Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1961) (limitation proceedings establish res judicata); 
Hanseatische Reederei Emil Offen & Co. v. Marine Terminals Corp., 1973 A.M.G. 1934, 1937-
38 (N.D. Gal. 1973) (findings in a limitation proceeding res judicata in any new action); see also 
Staring, supra note 40, at 1159-62 (describing the res judicata effect in various situations under 
the Act). 
354 U.S. 147 (1957). 
"For us to expand the jurisdictional provisions of the Act to prevent respondent from now 
proceeding in her state case would transform the Act from a protective instrument to an offensive 
weapon by which the shipowner could deprive suitors of their common-law rights . . . ."Id. at 
152. 
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plaintiff waived res judicata on any decision the state court might 
make on the subject.'®^ The district court retained jurisdiction over 
the petition for limitation but vacated the injunction, which allowed 
the plaintiff to proceed to her jury trial. 
The meaning of these cases'®® is that a procedure should not be 
adopted which so lightly destroys the jury rights and choice of fo­
rum'®® of plaintiffs, especially where the alternative—the condition 
precedent rule—abrogates the entire issue.'®^ Since no advantage 
exists for delaying the moment of reckoning with regard to antecedent 
liens, the better rule is the condition precedent, which prevents the 
limitation proceeding altogether if a fundamental substantive require­
ment of the Act cannot be met. In this way, destruction of the 
limitation claimants' jury rights is minimized. 
C. Priority Problems Raised by Limitation Lien Status 
A third problem with the Rodeo procedure is that it does not 
require discharge of all antecedent liens, but only those antecedent 
liens that are superior to the limitation liens. The court assumes that 
the lien status of the limitation claimants should be assessed against 
the lien status of the nonlimitation claimants. If the limitation claim­
ants' liens all have a priority higher than the nonlimitation liens. 
'« Id. at 149. 
For a concise discussion of the Langnes and Henn decisions, see Hanseatische Reederei 
Emil Offen & Co. v. Marine Terminals Corp., 1973 A.M.C. 1934 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
Preserving choice of forum to the tort victims is also of concern. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (the leading forum non conveniens case) ("[U]nless the balance 
is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."). 
In a limitation proceeding, the vessel owner chooses among a wide choice of fora, denying the 
tort claimants this right. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. F(9) (venue in any district where the vessel 
owner has been sued or the vessel has been arrested, or, if these events have not occurred, in any 
district where the vessel happens to be, or if the vessel is not in any district—i.e., on a long trip or 
destroyed—venue is in any district). Supplemental Rule F(9) allows for transfer of venue to "any 
district" if it serves the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
Incidentally, choice of forum with regard to the antecedent claimants is not an issue. These 
claimants may sue in personam outside of the Limitation Act. To vindicate their in rem rights, 
the antecedent claimants would have to go where the boat is anyway. Since, under the Rodeo 
proceeding, the vessel is in the custody of the court, it is perfectly consistent with in rem 
procedure or the antecedent claimants to bring their claims to the limitation court. The anteced­
ent lienholders may also prevent surrender of the vessel in a limitation proceeding altogether if 
they can libel prior to surrender in a limitation proceeding. In re Zebroid Trawling Corp., 428 
F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1970). 
Cf .  The Aquitania, 20 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1927) (petitioner sought concursus even though 
the fund exceeded potential claims). The Aquitania court rejected the petition with this com­
ment: "All that could be accomplished by [the vessel owner], if successful on this petition, would 
be to avoid jury trials. It would be permitting [the vessel owner] to try the case in another forum 
of its choice, and thus is unauthorized by the Act." Id. at 459. 
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discharge of the nonlimitation liens is not required. The court's rule 
therefore contemplates the survival of the liens in the limitation pro­
ceeding—if not inter se, then at least as against the antecedent liens. 
The Rodeo court ruled that only one of the liens which had 
theretofore appeared was immune from the Act. This antecedent 
lien—a ship mortgage—was not prior in right to any limitation 
lien.i®® Under the Ship Mortgage Act, tort claims and salvage claims 
are always given priority over mortgages.^®® The only limitation 
claimants who had so far appeared were three personal injury claim­
ants and a salvage claim. Thus, according to the court's procedural 
guidelines, the vessel owner would not have to discharge the mort­
gage. 
For the parties in the Rodeo case, then, the court s treatment of 
"prior liens" does not create difficult doctrinal problems. Problems 
instantly arise, however, if we change the facts and assume that, for 
instance, there is a small supply claim in the limitation proceeding. In 
such a case, the salvage and personal injury claims in the limitation 
After the Good Boy sank, it was salvaged. The salvor appeared in the limitation proceed­
ing, claiming its lien was subsequent to the limitation voyage, so that its claim was immune from 
limitation of the vessel owner's liability. The Fifth Circuit, however, ruled that salvage claims at 
the end of the voyage were always limitation claims. 651 F.2d at 1105 (citing Metropolitan 
Redwood Lumber Co. v. Doe, 223 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1912)). 
It should be readily apparent by now that nothing is simple when it regards the Limitation 
Act. While it is beyond the scope of this Article, I would suggest that the Rodeo court misread the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Metropolitan Redwood Lumber. In that case, a salvor towed the 
injured vessel to port, suggesting that the voyage had not "ended until arrival in port. Cf. The 
H.F. Dimock, 186 F. 662, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) (value of vessel not reduced by salvage cost 
where collision did not end the voyage). If salvage had occurred after the voyage had ended, 
presumably the Supreme Court would not have ruled the salvor to be a limitation claimant. In 
contrast the scanty facts in Rodeo, based solely upon the allegations in the vessel owner's petition, 
suggest that the voyage ended when the M/V Good Boy sank to the bottom of the Mississippi. In 
such case, the salvage claim may not be considered a limitation claimant. A rule that salvage is 
always a limitation claim (unless the salvor can show that salvage was pursuant to a "personal 
contract" with the vessel owner, 651 F.2d at 1105 n.7) is clearly wrong, as can be shown by 
reference to facts in The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 (1886). In Norwich, the Court thought 
that when the voyage "ends" at the time of the collision, the vessel should be valued without 
regard to subsequent repairs or services. In that case, the vessel had been worth $25,000 after 
salvage. Salvage, however, cost $22,500. The Court therefore approved a valuation of $2,500 for 
the vessel, representing salvaged value minus the cost of salvage. The Court justified the 
valuation on the grounds that the vessel owner's liability ought not to be increased because he 
undertook repairs on the vessel after the voyage had ended. See supra note 75. Let us suppose 
that the salvor in Norwich had an outstanding claim for salvage. The Rodeo court would 
presumably require the salvor to seek reimbursement in the limitation proceeding. The vessel 
owner would therefore benefit from a decreased valuation of the vessel to $2,500 (to reflect the 
cost of salvage). The salvor, meanwhile, would have to compete with other claimants for the 
$2,500 fund. The result of salvage always coming within the Limitation Act is an unconscionable 
windfall for the vessel owner at the expense of the salvor. 
46 U.S.C. § 953(a) (1976). 
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proceeding are senior to the mortgage'®" which is senior to the supply 
claim.'®' The supply claim, in turn, is entitled to share the limitation 
fund pro rata with the salvage and tort claims.'®^ 
Depending on what one believes is the status of liens held by 
limitation claimants, it might at first glance be thought that the court 
of appeals is setting up a circular priority system.'®" The classic 
circularity problem does not actually arise here, since the issue is not 
which of the claimants should be paid first, but whether "prior" liens 
must be discharged in order for the vessel owner to be exonerated 
from further liability on the remaining claims. 
The logical possibilities are bicameral in nature: (A) discharge of 
antecedent liens is never required unless all limitation liens are inferior 
in right; or (B) discharge is required whenever a single limitation lien 
is inferior. Both of the logical possibilities are unsatisfactory. To dem­
onstrate this, let us again assume that a minor supply claim is among 
the limitation claims in Rodeo. The supply claim is inferior to the 
mortgage, but the mortgage is inferior to the other limitation claims. 
The supply claim is entitled to share pro rata with the other limitation 
claims (salvage and tort). 
The first logical possibility is that the mortgage (superior to the 
supply claim but inferior to the salvage and personal injury claims) 
need not be discharged. If this is the rule, then the Rodeo court is not 
doing what it purports to be doing—vindicating the lien status of the 
limitation claims. Under this rule, the mortgage is being subordinated 
to the supply claim, in violation of the statutory priority accorded to 
preferred ship mortgages. This follows because the mortgagee is being 
excluded from sharing in the proceeds from the sale of the vessel while 
the supply claim is not. Upon sale of the vessel, of course, the mort­
gage lien is destroyed, and an inferior lien is allowed at least partial 
compensation. 
Id. 
46 U.S.C. § 953(a) (1977) (Subsequent supply liens lose to previous mortgages. "First in 
time, first in right."). 
Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 122 (1871) (cargo claim and tort claim). 
This circularity problem actually would have been present in In re Zebroid Trawling Corp., 428 
F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1970), if the vessel owner had been able to surrender the vessel to set up the 
limitation fund. There, the widow's tort claim would have been superior to a mortgage, which 
would have been superior to a supply lien. The supply lien was entitled to share pro rata with the 
tort lien. See supra note 119. 
See 2 G. Gilmore, Secxtwty Interests in Personal Property § 39.1 (1965) ("What should 
be done when an inadequate fund is to be distributed among competing claimants and under 
applicable rules of law . . . B and G have claims entitled to equal priority, one of which is 
superior, the other inferior, to A's claim?"). Gilmore's treatment of circular priorities is must 
reading for those metaphysically hardy enough to pursue such a topic. 
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Under the second possibility, the mortgage must be discharged 
because of the tiny cargo claim hypothetically present among the 
limitation claims. This rule would create an unhealthy economic 
incentive for the vessel owner (or, of course, his insurer) to pay off the 
low priority cargo claim in full in order to avoid having to discharge 
the entire mortgage. If the cargo claimant accepts a settlement from 
the vessel owner, the mortgage lien, of course, is lost. And there is at 
least the theoretical possibility that the mortgagee would find it ad­
vantageous to arrange some sort of bribe to the cargo claimant to 
refuse the vessel owner's tender of payment, since, with the cargo 
claim present, the mortgagee is either entitled to discharge or is in a 
position to pursue his in rem rights against the vessel after the limita­
tion proceeding falls apart.'®* The inducement of corruption was 
relied upon by Professor Gilmore in rejecting certain solutions to the 
circular priority problem.'®® It is therefore appropriate that we con­
sider these matters here. But apart from any inducement to corrup­
tion, this second and more extreme corollary to the Rodeo variant 
ought to be rejected because it reverses ancient maritime lien priorities 
in cases where it is cheaper to discharge the inferior limitation liens 
than it is to discharge the more expensive high priority antecedent 
liens. 
The pseudo-circular priority problem is avoided, however, if we 
assume that the Limitation Act estops the enforcement of limitation 
liens, an assumption which comports with practical reality—denial of 
priorities inter se and the right to arrest the vessel.'®® Under such a 
doctrine, all antecedent liens—regardless of priority—must be dis­
charged before limitation of liability is allowed. 
Is a rule that the Limitation Act estops enforcement of limitation 
liens fair to all interested parties? Undoubtedly it is. The limitation 
The chances that a mortgagee will find it profitable to bribe a cargo claimant to stay in the 
limitation proceeding are remote, but possible. Suppose that there are $3,000,000 in personal 
injury claims, and two cargo claims, one for $1,000,000 and one for $100. Suppose further that 
there is an antecedent mortgagee who would like to protect his lien on the vessel, which is worth 
$1,000,000. If the vessel owner pays off the cargo claims and contributes the vessel to the 
limitation fund, his out-of-pocket expense is $2,000,100 for $4,000,100 worth of claims. The 
mortgagee, whose lien need not be discharged, loses its lien, and if the vessel owner is insolvent, 
the mortgagee loses out altogether. But if the mortgagee bribes the $100 claimant to stay in, the 
limitation proceeding falls apart, and the mortgagee may foreclose his lien against the vessel. Of 
course, the vessel is worth $1,000,000 and the personal injury claims, worth $3,000,000 have 
superior liens. But if, for some reason, the personal injury plaintiffs do not choose to pursue the 
vessel—i.e., there is a direct action against the liability insurer, where there is a right to a jury 
trial—then it might be advantageous for the mortgagee to resort to bribery of the $100 cargo 
claimant. 
2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 39.2 (1965). 
"• See supra text accompanying notes 59-69. 
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claimants are not served by those liens in any way. The most these 
claimants can expect, unfortunately, is a proportionate share of the 
limitation fund. And if the limitation proceeding collapses (e.g., the 
vessel owner is found to have privity and knowledge during the ensu­
ing litigation), the limitation liens would fully recover their previous 
status in any future in rem distribution. 
The antecedent lienholders are hardly prejudiced. They are ei­
ther paid off entirely or left free, upon the collapse of the limitation 
proceeding, to pursue the vessel with in rem process. Any effect on 
them is entirely beneficial. Neither is the vessel owner prejudiced. The 
vessel owner's liability to limitation claimants is the value of the vessel 
and earned freight whether or not the limitation claimants are secured 
or unsecured creditors. If he cannot do this much, because of out­
standing nonlimitation liens, the vessel owner has little right to com­
plain. After all, his obligation is to pay his debts or at least to provide 
security therefor when the debts are liquidated. 
As a final matter on fairness of estoppel, it was admitted earlier 
that estoppel reverses maritime lien priorities.I have also sug­
gested that the two logical resolutions of the pusedo-circularity prob­
lem other than estoppel also tend to reverse lien priorities.'®® We 
therefore must choose between competing evils. 
The estoppel solution should be chosen because it is the fairest of 
the options. In addition, if estoppel is the law, a court will never have 
to award a low priority lien status over a high priority lien. With the 
condition precedent rule in effect, the vessel owner must either pay off 
nonlimitation liens or must post adequate bond, keeping the vessel 
free for future arrest. If he can do neither, the limitation proceeding 
falls apart and all liens are preserved. Thus, estoppel, when combined 
with the condition precedent rule as to nonlimitation liens, does not 
affect lien priorities as much as might appear upon first impression, 
except to the extent that a vessel owner is encouraged to prefer an 
inferior lienholder whose claim arose before the limitation voyage. 
But this does not harm limitation claimants who in any case can look 
only to the limitation fund for compensation. 
To conclude, it has been shown that estoppel of the limitation 
liens poses no harm to any interested party. It is therefore best to 
declare that the Limitation Act estops enforcement of liens of those 
claimants whose claims are limited by the Act. If estoppel is declared 
to be the law, the courts can avoid a vexing circularity problem. 
See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 163. 
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VIL SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT LIENS 
In any case where the vessel has not been destroyed at the end of 
the limitation voyage, it is possible that subsequent liens not subject to 
the Limitation Act will arise. But in light of what has been said these 
liens do not pose any new doctrinal problems. 
Subsequent liens should be treated in the same manner as ante­
cedent liens. In other words, we should assume that enforcement of 
liens subject to the limitation proceeding is estopped. If the vessel 
owner wishes to stock the limitation fund by posting a bond in lieu of 
surrendering the vessel, then the amount posted should be equivalent 
to the value of the vessel and earned freight, plus any amounts due 
under the Loss of Life amendments. If the bond is posted, the subse­
quent lienholder—like his antecedent brethren—is unaffected. The 
vessel remains at large and is susceptible to arrest by the subsequent 
lienholder. Where the subsequent lienholder has already arrested the 
vessel, the vessel owner loses his option to surrender the vessel as a 
means of establishing the limitation fund. The Zebroid case is equally 
persuasive authority on this point for subsequent as well as for ante­
cedent lienholders. 
In surrender cases, the vessel owner should be required to dis­
charge the subsequent liens or at least to post security to guarantee 
payment of them.^®® In the absence of discharge, subsequent liens are 
just as likely to exhaust the limitation fund as are antecedent liens. In 
support of equality of treatment for subsequent liens, we may note 
that Supplemental Rule F(2) requires all outstanding liens to be 
listed—regardless of whether they are prior or later in time than the 
limitation voyage. 
Similarly, it is possible that liens could arise during the limitation 
voyage but not be subject to the Limitation Act. Where the vessel 
169 "[Tjhe owner must surrender the vessel or have it appraised free of all prior and all 
subsequent liens." The Pelotas, 21 F.2d 236, 239 (E.D. La. 1927). 
"" Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. F(2). Rule F(2) does not require all antecedent liens to be listed, but 
only *'prior paramount liens." This could be taken to mean that certain antecedent liens are not 
paramount, and hence they need not be listed in the complaint, or, by implication, discharged as 
a condition precedent to limitation. In fact, this implication may have been made by the Rodeo 
court. My response is that such far-ranging implications need not be drawn from the use of the 
stray word "paramount." The word could mean "still outstanding. The word paramount is 
not used with regard to subsequent liens, i.e., a subsequent supply lien where all the limitation 
claims are in tort. Therefore, we need not assume that the Supreme Court, in promulgating Rule 
F(2), was making a statement on the scope of the condition precedent rule. It may be further 
noted that the Rodeo court itself discounted the meaning of Rule F(2) with regard to the 
condition precedent rule, noting that the requirement of listing the liens was not the same as 
requiring that they be discharged. 661 F.2d at 1104. Similar reasoning precludes that we make 
too much of the word "paramount." 
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owner comes under the Loss of Life amendments, he may not limit his 
liability where the master of the vessel was personally negligent at the 
beginning of the voyage. In these narrow circumstances, the vessel 
owner will be unable to limit liability against personal injury and 
wrongful death claimants even if he personally is without knowledge 
or privity,'''^ hut may remain able to limit his liability against prop­
erty claimants. Hence, there can be a personal injury lien which is not 
subject to an ongoing limitation proceeding against noninjury claim­
ants.'''® Also, wage liens'''® and any lien arising from a "personal 
contract" of the vessel owner'''^ cannot be subject to the Limitation 
Act. Charter parties, for example, have been held to be personal 
contracts and therefore immune from the Act."® Under these cir­
cumstances, liens arising during the limitation voyage cannot be made 
subject to the Act and hence holders of such liens retain their right to 
foreclose. Like the subsequent liens, these concurrent liens should be 
discharged as a condition precedent to the limitation proceedings.'''® 
Finally, it may happen that a vessel is encumbered by an out­
standing lien not subject to the Limitation Act as to which the vessel 
owner has no personal liability. For instance, the vessel may have 
been purchased just before the limitation voyage. Prior to the pur­
chase, a collision may have occurred. The new vessel owner would not 
be liable in personam for that collision, but the vessel remains encum­
bered by a tort lien.''" In such a case, the vessel owner should be 
46 U.S.C. § 183(e) (1976). 
E.g., Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1961), 
cert, denied, 362 U.S. 991 (1962); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Armco Steel Corp., 272 
F.2d 873, 876 (2d Cir. 1959). 
46 U.S.C. § 189 (1976); In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 318 (N.D.N.Y. 
1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981). 
Crowe, supra note 20, at 1094. 
G. cilmore & c. Black, supra note 1, § 10-26, at 899-900. 
Gilmore and Black wonder whether the exempted concurrent lienholders in the Moorer 
McGormack limitation proceeding, supra note 172, might somehow be able to intervene and 
thereby reduce the size of the limitation fund. G. Gilmore & G. Black, supra note 1, § 10-40, at 
932. Of course, such plaintiffs would intervene only where the vessel owner has no other assets 
whatsoever. 
Gilmore and Black have forgotten their own condition precedent rule. If the personal injury 
plaintiffs have lien status, their liens must be discharged as a condition precedent to the 
limitation proceeding. Gilmore and Black are on point only to the extent that the plaintiffs have 
no other claim except an unsecured Jones Act claim, a very unlikely event. See supra note 56. In 
the very narrow case where a Jones Act claimant is excluded from the limitation fund by the 
knowledge and privity of the captain, the Jones Act plaintiff would seem to be out of luck. The 
limitation claimants have the right to challenge the Jones Act claimant's right to share in the 
fund. See Fed. B. Civ. P. Supp. F(8). 
See The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1898) (maritime liens survive a private 
sale). 
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required to discharge the lien as a condition precedent to a limitation 
proceeding, even though he has no obligation in laAv to pay the 
charterer's torts.The fundamental policy behind the condition 
precedent rule is to preserve the full unencumbered value of the vessel 
to the limitation claimants. When the vessel is surrendered subject to 
the type of collision lien described above, the lien threatens to reduce 
the limitation fund. Such a reduction should not be allowed, even if it 
means that the vessel owner must forego surrender and post the bond. 
The vessel owner's overriding obligation to the limitation claimants is 
to contribute the full value of the vessel to the limitation fund. No 
antecedent, concurrent or subsequent maritime lien should be permit­
ted to allow the vessel owner to escape from this responsibility. 
VIII. THE LIMITATION PROCEEDING AS AN IN REM 
AND IN PERSONAM ACTION 
A question curiously left unanswered by Congress is whether a 
court to which a vessel has been surrendered can sell the vessel in an in 
rem sale, as opposed to an ordinary marshall's sale. The answer to this 
question is important. 
In an in rem sale, notice of the sale is given to the world."® The 
sale is therefore good against all claimants. The vessel is conveyed to 
the purchaser free of all claims and encumbrances.^®" Any claimants 
with liens on the vessel must intervene and claim against the fund, not 
against the vessel.'®i Naturally, a sale of this sort brings a higher 
price than an ordinary judicial sale, since the vessel can be offered 
with clear title. 
A sale pursuant to attachment or execution on a judgment is 
entirely different. Notice is given only to the defendants joined in the 
action.^®^ When the vessel is subsequently sold, the marshall sells 
only the defendant's interest.'®® Having been given no notice, the sale 
cannot affect the interests of persons who are not made parties to the 
litigation. Therefore, maritime liens survive the ordinary judicial 
sale.'®^ The price at such a sale is bound to be drastically lower, 
because the vessel is conveyed subject to encumbrances. 
G. cilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 4-23, at 242. 
'™ Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. C(4). 
See generally Rogers, Enforcement of Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 47 Tul. L. Rev. 767 
(1973). 
Id. at 778-79. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. B(2). 
See The Morning Star, 5 F. Supp. 502, 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1933). 
"* Harmon, Discharge and Waiver of Maritime Liens, 47 Tul. L. Rev. 786, 787 (1973). 
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What kind of sale can be conducted in a limitation proceeding— 
in rem or ordinary judicial sale? If only the ordinary judicial sale is 
contemplated, then the Limitation Act truly has no effect upon non-
limitation lienholders who could pursue the vessel following the judi­
cial sale. The sale would simply affect the vessel owner's interest, and 
no more. But the price the vessel would bring would equate with the 
encumbered value of the vessel. In such a case, the limitation claim­
ants are greatly prejudiced, because the limitation fund, which may 
be established by surrender of the vessel, will be founded upon the 
encumbered value of the vessel. 
It therefore makes much more sense to declare that the sale of the 
vessel in a surrender case should be pursuant to the court's in rem 
powers. Such a power certainly exists as a jurisdictional matter by 
virtue of the court's possession of the vessel.'®® If this power is uti­
lized, surrender of the vessel succeeds in securing for the limitation 
claimants the full limitation fund contemplated by the Act. Anteced­
ent and other nonlimitation lienholders would be given the notice to 
which they are entitled and would be forced to claim against the 
limitation fund. Of course, because of the condition precedent rule in 
surrender cases, these liens must be discharged as soon as they appear. 
Otherwise, the right of the vessel owner to limit liability in the limita­
tion proceeding is lost. Therefore, two birds are dispatched with a 
single stone. Unknown lienholders not subject to the Act are flushed 
out and forced to present themselves (to the detriment of the vessel 
owner's right to a limitation proceeding, if he cannot pay off these 
lienholders or post a bond to protect the limitation claimants), and the 
limitation claimants are guaranteed that the fund established by the 
sale of the vessel will be based upon the unencumbered value of the 
vessel. No unfairness to the nonlimitation lienholders exists either. It is 
true that they are being flushed out, when otherwise they could rest 
upon their rights, but these lienholders must always step forward 
whenever any in rem action is commenced. Inconvenience caused to 
them is not different in kind from that caused whenever the vessel is 
arrested by another lienholder. 
The Federal Rules are ambiguous but not unfavorable to an in 
rem sale in a limitation proceeding. The governing rule on actions in 
rem states that such a procedure is available "[wjhenever a statute of 
the United States provides for a maritime action in rem or a proceed­
ing analogous thereto."'®® Limitation proceedings are sufficiently 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 217-18 (1927). 
Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. C(l)(b). 
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"analogous" to the typical in rem proceeding to qualify. Notice to the 
world is always required for a limitation proceeding, as it is for an in 
rem proceeding.^®'' No reason exists, therefore, to prevent an admi­
ralty court from conducting an in rem sale. Admiralty courts have this 
unique power over vessels all to themselves. Since it does some good in 
a limitation proceeding, and no illegitimate harm is done to any 
interested party, the power should be used.'®® 
Even if it is agreed that the limitation court may conduct an in 
rem sale, it is nevertheless beyond doubt that a limitation proceeding 
is based upon in personam jurisdiction over the vessel owner. The 
Supreme Court has stated the limitation proceeding to be a hybrid in 
personam and in rem action. According to the Court in Hartford 
Accident h Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co.,'®® "[t]he cases 
show that the court may enter judgment in personam against the 
owner as well as judgment in rem against the res or the substituted 
fund . . . ."'®® Thus, if the vessel owner is ultimately denied the right 
to limit liability, he may find in personam judgments filed against 
him. But more important to us at this point is the Supreme Court's 
statement that the limitation proceeding is based partly on the court's 
in rem jurisdiction.'®' As long as this kind of jurisdiction is being 
Id. F(4). 
See 273 U.S. at 215-16 ("[T]his Court has by its rules and decisions given the statute a very 
broad and equitable construction for the purpose of carrying out its purpose and for facilitating a 
settlement of the whole controversy over such losses as are comprehended within it . . . ."). 
Judge Benedict's remarks in The Mendota, 14 F. 358, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1882), about the 
court's power of sale in a limitation proceeding, are broad enough to suggest that an in rem sale 
should be chosen for its practical benefits; 
It has been said that the statute confers no power upon this court to direct such 
a sale [of a vessel previously attached by a state sheriff], nor does it, in express terms. 
But such power is to be implied, because necessary to the exercise of powers that are 
expressed. The supreme court of the United States, sitting in admiralty, found in the 
statute power to restrain the further proceeding of suits against the ship-owner, and 
the power to stay such proceedings must include the power to save from destruction 
property which otherwise the stay will destroy. The power to sell the ship rests upon 
the same ground as the power to protect the owner from suits, namely, the necessity 
of the case. 
It is significant that the treatise which bears Judge Benedict's name assumes that a limitation 
court should conduct an in rem sale, citing The Mendota as authority for the proposition. See 3 
E. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY 458 (6th ed. 1940); cf. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra 
note 1, at 816 (bankruptcy court can adjudicate maritime liens, and "it can hardly be doubted 
that it has . . . power to sell a ship free of liens . . . ."). The Bankruptcy Reform Act has 
amended Title 28 to make clear that bankruptcy courts do have admiralty powers. 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1481 (West Supp. 1981) (effective 1984). 
273 U.S. 207 (1927). 
Id. at 215 (citation omitted). 
"The jurisdiction of the admiralty court attaches in rem and in personam by reason of the 
custody of the res put by the petitioner into its hands." Id. at 217. 
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exercised, there is no reason why in rem sales cannot be used to 
establish the limitation fund. 
CONCLUSION 
There are two key elements in sorting out the relationship be­
tween maritime liens and claims under the Limitation Act. First, in 
surrender cases, courts should assert the condition precedent rule as to 
liens not subject to the Act, requiring that such liens be discharged or 
that sufficient sums be paid to the court to guarantee discharge. The 
Rodeo decision stands in the way of the condition precedent, how­
ever, and we can only hope that the case is not followed. 
The condition precedent is useful only for the surrender cases. In 
the bond-posting cases, the rule is well established that the amount of 
the bond or the amount of money paid into the court must equate 
with the unencumbered value of the vessel, plus freight and other 
amounts which may be required. Since our chief concern is that the 
full amount of the limitation fund be reserved for the limitation 
claimants, safe from reduction because of nonlimitation liens, we 
need not extend the condition precedent rule to bond-posting cases. 
This point was recognized by the First Circuit in Zebroid. Gilmore 
and Black go farther and argue that the condition precedent should be 
applied to the bond-posting cases, and they do so because they are out 
to deny vessel owners any limitation of liability where insolvency of 
the owner may be present. I have suggested, however, that applica­
tion of the rule to bond-posting cases will not succeed in preventing 
insolvent vessel owners from limiting liability because insurance com­
panies will intercede to discharge outstanding liens where it is profit­
able to do so. 
The second important point which should be recognized is that, 
the Limitation Act stops enforcement of the liens subject to a petition 
for limitation of liability. Estoppel of the liens comports with reality: 
limitation claimants may not arrest the vessel and have no priority 
inter se. Nor can they compete outside the limitation proceeding 
against nonlimitation liens, since the concurstis confines them to the 
limitation proceeding. Estoppel of limitation liens is also fair to all 
interested parties. 
No court has held that the Limitation Act estops enforcement of 
the liens of limitation claimants, and the Fifth Circuit in Rodeo has 
held to the contrary. Again, we can only hope that the Rodeo decision 
is not followed, for, as I have shown, it raises pseudo-circularity 
problems of considerable metaphysical difficulty. These problems can 
be totally avoided, however, if estoppel of limitation liens is the rule. 
It is for this reason that a doctrine of estoppel is a good idea. 
